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Like all organizations, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) has a history and a culture. Its close ties to the United Nations (UN) 
and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) suggest 
that it is something more than a criminal court, and its broad interpretation 
of customary law, in particular its formulation of the concept of joint 
criminal enterprise (JCE), appear to mark it as a court of transitional 
justice. The proliferation of similar courts over the past two decades, 
including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which 
shares an Appeals Chamber with the ICTY, and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which differs from the ICTY in having been established by 
treaty, appear to make it, if not a model for, at least a harbinger of future 
developments in international law. It has also sought to influence the politics 
of the successor states to Yugoslavia and the opinions of those who have 
commented on the Yugoslav wars. Nonetheless, most people, including a 
majority of scholars, would be hard-pressed to define the concept of JCE 
or describe the culture of the ICTY. This essay argues that the ICTY has 
slipped the moorings of its Statute and embarked on a course that has led 
it to create new legal doctrines that undermine international law and that 
scholars who cite the materials assembled by its prosecutors and consult the 
decisions handed down by its judges should do so with caution, bearing in 
mind that the goals and the functions of a transitional court are radically 
different from those of a criminal court.
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Ad Hoc Courts and Legal Norms
Describing the ICTY is deceptively simple: it is an ad hoc criminal court 
that was created by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1993 to 
prosecute “persons responsible for serious violations of international humani-
tarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991” as 
part of an effort to assure peace and stability in the region. Its statute lists the 
violations over which it has jurisdiction under the headings of “grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,” “violations of the laws or customs of war,” 
“genocide,” and “crimes against humanity.”1 The relative seriousness of these 
crimes is debatable, but most would agree that those who committed them 
should be held responsible for their actions during the wars that accompanied 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia.2 However, like previous international criminal 
tribunals, the ICTY confronted two problems—it could not try all those ac-
cused of having committed crimes without indicting thousands of people,3 
and it had to render final judgments on the basis of incomplete evidence.4 
1 ICTY Statute, Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm, con-
sulted 8/16/99. Also see James C. O’Brien, “The International Tribunal for Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia,” The American Journal of International 
Law, 87 (4) (1993): 639-659; Frédéric Mégret, “The Politics of International Criminal Justice,” 
European Journal of International Law 13 (2002), pp. 1261-1284; and Pierre Hazan, Justice in a 
Time of War. The True Story behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004).
2 Micaela Frulli, “Are Crimes against Humanity More Serious than War Crimes?” European 
Journal of International Law 12(2) (2001): 329-350, concludes that crimes against humanity ap-
pear to be worse than war crimes. James Meernik, “Victor’s Justice or the Law? Judging and 
Punishing at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 47 (2) (2003): 151, “weighted” genocide a 3, crimes against humanity a 2, and war 
crimes a 1. Such weighting is arbitrary; and while Eric D. Weitz, “Comment: On the Meaning 
of Genocide and Genocide Denial,” Slavic Review 67 (2) (2008): 415-421, argues that the mass 
murder at Srebrenica was genocide, he laments the “wild, inflationary use of the term” and 
notes that the 1948 UN General Assembly Convention was a “political compromise” that nar-
rowed Raphael Lemkin’s original definition. Even Antonio Cassese, “The Proper Limits of Indi-
vidual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 5 (1) (2007): 130, thinks the Appeals Chamber that heard Tadić was wrong “to 
consider the same offense as more grave if regarded as a crime against humanity than as a war 
crime.”
3 William A. Schabas, “Victor’s Justice: Selecting ‘Situations’ at the International Criminal 
Court,” John Marshall Law Review 43 (3) (2010), p. 542, notes that the international system is 
not “a functional system displaying the attributes of the rule of law” in which “all serious crimes 
against the person will be prosecuted.”
4 Theodor Meron, “Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals,” 
American Journal of International Law 100 (3) (2006): 551-579, notes that the judgments of such 
tribunals are final but based on “incomplete” evidence and notes that in 1919 the victors initially 
contemplated the indictment of 20,000 Germans for war crimes, and that in 1945 the United 
States suggested criminalizing entire organizations, thereby inculpating millions of Germans. 
But in 1919, only 12 were tried, of whom 6 were convicted, an “experiment in retributive justice” 
that Meron considers “a dismal failure.” In 1946, the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
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Prosecutors therefore had to select whom to indict, and because the majority 
of those indicted during the 1990s were Serbs, it initially came under fire for 
bias against Serbs. As it indicted more Croats, it came to be seen as having a 
bias against Croats as well. Muslims, who many see as the only real victims of 
the wars, are unhappy that their leaders also have been indicted and that their 
former enemies and allies have not been sentenced to longer terms in prison.5
Whether these perceptions were accurate, the American judge Patricia 
Wald considered the Tribunal to be an unrepresentative institution because it 
had “no public constituency,” a reality that “often” led her to ask herself “how 
accountable” she and her fellow judges were and “to whom?”6 The answer to her 
question is that the ICTY is responsible to the UN Security Council (UNSC), 
which created and continues to fund the Tribunal, to nominate its judges, 
and to advise them on procedural matters.7 The ICTY is thus an “exogenous” 
court which was established and functions outside the states whose citizens 
berg (IMT/N) indicted 22 Nazi leaders, of whom 12 were hanged, 7 sentenced to prison, and 3 
acquitted. The IMT in the Far East (IMT/FE) indicted and convicted 25 Japanese leaders, and 
sentenced 7 to death. In addition to these leaders, the Allies tried 980 Japanese and 177 Germans 
for war crimes. National judicial systems faced similar problems in 1995. For example, following 
a successful military offensive in Western Slavonia that May, Croatian leaders, who were being 
pressed by the US ambassador to amnesty alleged war criminals, discussed how many of 252 
Serbs suspected of having committed crimes to prosecute. Given the difficulties of obtaining “le-
gitimate evidence” and “strong witnesses,” Nikica Valentić suggested that only the most serious 
cases be prosecuted and everyone else be amnestied, a suggestion adopted by FranjoTuđman 
and the other Croatian leaders present. See ICTY, Presidential Transcript, 13 May 1995, (Hard 
Copy, English Translation).
5 Croatian forces (the HV and HVO) both fought with and against the largely Muslim Army 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, depending on the period and area. For perceptions of bias, see Dan 
Saxon, “Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY among the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim 
Communities in the Former Yugoslavia,” Journal of Human Rights, 4 (2005): 559-67; Victor Pes-
kin and Mieczysław P. Boduszyňski, “International Justice and Domestic Politics: Post-Tudjman 
Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Europe-Asia Stud-
ies 55 (7) (2003): 1117B42, noted the resistance of many Croats to the Tribunal even under a 
“democratic” coalition, but attributed it to the persistence of “nationalist” politics and “authori-
tarian forces [that] still posed a threat.” However, they present no compelling empirical data to 
support their assertion. 
6 See Patricia Wald, “International Criminal Courts: Some Kudos and Concerns,” Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society, 150 (2) (June 2006): 245.
7 The ICTY was created by the Security Council, the executive body of the United Nations, 
not by the General Assembly, the UN’s representative body. It is not a constitutional entity and 
does not exist within a state structure; its legitimacy ultimately derives from the permanent 
members of the Security Council, which funds the Tribunal and has advised it on case manage-
ment. Gregory P. Lombardi, “Legitimacy and the Expanding Power of the ICTY,” New England 
Law Review 37 (4) (2002-2003): 899-901, concludes that the UNSC’s “collusion” with the ICTY 
and its efforts to interfere in the ICC reinforce doubts that such tribunals are independent. For 
the UNSC’s role in international justice, also see Karima Bennoune, “Sovereignty vs. Suffering? 
Re-examining Sovereignty and Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq,” European Journal of 
International Law 13 (1) (2002): 243-262.
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it prosecutes. According to Kaminski, Nalepa, and O’Neill, such courts are 
legitimate if administered “under the auspices of an ongoing institution” and 
“by agents who were not engaged in the conflict.” However, if “retribution is 
administered externally without regard to the wishes of the citizens of the state 
in transition (e.g., some war crimes trials),” the justice meted out is “victor’s 
justice” and lacks “legitimacy.”8
Unlike the criminal courts in the states formed from Yugoslavia, the ICTY 
is not part of a judicial system created by a constitution endorsed by a state’s 
citizens.9 Like its predecessors, it is an ad hoc court, and like them, it derives its 
legitimacy from a body foreign to the states over which it has jurisdiction, in 
its case the Security Council, the executive organ of the UN.10 But it is not the 
permanent court of the UN, a distinction that belongs to the ICJ, which hears 
cases involving states, not individuals.11 Nor is the Tribunal administered by 
agents who were not involved in the conflicts over which it has jurisdiction. 
The UN, the EU, and the United States were all involved in the Yugoslav wars 
from their inception. The UN and the EU sent mediators and observers to 
the region; NATO enforced no-fly zones and conducted air strikes on Serb 
positions; the United States advised both the Croatian and Bosnian armed 
forces; and troops operating under the UN’s flag protected both Serb-occupied 
8 Marck M. Kaminski, Monika Nalepa, and Barry O’Neill, “Normative and Strategic Aspects 
of Transitional Justice,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (3) (2006): 295-302. Lilian A. Barria 
and Steven D. Roper, “How Effective Are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the 
ICTY and the ICTR,” International Journal of Human Rights 9 (3) (2005): 360, 364, argue that 
“systems of justice can only be effective when all parties recognize the legitimacy of the judicial 
process.” The signatories to the Dayton Accords accepted the ICTY but they did not create it, 
and a significant number of the people of these states have considered its indictments and rul-
ings less than fair. 
9 Patricia M. Wald “Punishment of War Crimes by International Tribunals,” Social Research 
69(4) (2002): 1121, 1126, and 247, 258, argued that the ICTY was “an accepted part of the set-
tlement of the conflict” and subsequently “earned” its legitimacy by prosecuting military and 
political leaders from the successor states. But to focus on leaders cannot confer legitimacy; at 
most, doing so confirms that it has fulfilled its mandate to prosecute those responsible for cer-
tain crimes. Minna Schrag, “The Yugoslav Crimes Tribunal: A Prosecutor’s View,” Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law 6 (1) (1995): 192-3, argued that while the Tribunal’s “pri-
mary focus” was on “the leaders who were responsible for instigating and directing the crimes,” 
it could not “hope to persuade the victims that justice has been done” unless it prosecuted indi-
viduals “at all levels of responsibility.” 
10 For discussion, see Kenneth W. Abbott, “International Theory, International Law, and the 
Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts,” American Journal of International Law 93 
(2) (1999): 361-379.
11 Wald, “International Criminal Courts,” p. 1128, notes that among the ICJ decision rejected 
by the ICTY is how to ascertain whether a states exercises “control” over military organizations 
operating in another country.
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territories in Croatia and “safe zones” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.12 Since the 
ICTY was created by the UNSC and has been dependent on the UN, the EU 
and the US, and since most citizens of the successor states to Yugoslavia are 
excluded from participation except as defendants and many oppose its broad 
indictments, it seem difficult not to conclude that, like its predecessors in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, the Tribunal administers a form of “victor’s justice.”13
The judges at the ICTY wrote and have repeatedly revised its rules and 
procedures, which are an amalgam of common law and civil law as practiced 
in Western states.14 The Tribunal therefore mixes the adversarial practices of 
common law with the inquisitorial practices of civil law.15 It is a difficult mar-
riage at best and one that David Wippman believes has resulted in “inconsis-
tency and significant misunderstandings, both internationally and externally,” 
and has “at times” “jeopardized the rights of the accused.”16 The need to finish 
its work led the Tribunal’s judges to revise its rules to allow plea bargaining, 
suspension of indictments, and the use of written statements in place of oral 
12 The literature on the involvement of the major powers is voluminous and includes memoirs, 
document collections, popular histories, and scholarly studies. Nonetheless, many scholars and 
commentators have tended to treat this involvement as if it were peripheral to the wars and had 
little or no influence on their conduct and outcome. 
13  Schabas, “Victor’s Justice,” pp. 537, 543, argues that the “political agenda” of the ICTY was 
“set by . . . the ‘permanent’ five” on the Security Council, so the reasons for creating the ICTY 
and ICTR were “inscrutable to the extent that they represent compromises by government nego-
tiators acting on the basis of national interests.” Meron, “Reflections,” p. 562, concludes that the 
Japanese people tacitly repudiated the International Military Tribunal for the Far East because 
three of those it convicted later held ministerial posts. If so, the success of politicians involved in 
the wars and popular protests against the ICTY’s indictments and decisions suggest that many 
Serbs and Croats have repudiated the ICTY. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, ICTY, Press Release, 
“The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Making a Difference or Mak-
ing Excuses?” The Hague, 13 May 1999, told the US Council on Foreign Relations that even 
before NATO began to bomb Serbia in 1999, “the Tribunal was viewed negatively by a large seg-
ment of the population of the region,” supposedly due to “virulent anti-Tribunal propaganda.” 
David Talbert, “The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship,” New England Law 
Review 37 (4) (2002-2003): 976, thought that the ICTY had “failed to engage the region’s justice 
systems generally,” and Patricia Wald, “International Criminal Courts,” p. 252, that “one of [the] 
greatest failures” of the ICTY was “an inability to reach the ‘hearts and minds of the populaces 
who suffered as victims of the leaders and of their subordinates who committed the war crimes.”
14 Judges from two other legal systems, the Islamic and the Communist, sit on the ICTY. 
For a comparison of Islamic with civil and common law, see Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara 
McLaughlin Mitchell, “The International Court of Justice and the World’s Three Legal Systems,” 
The Journal of Politics 69 (2) (2007): 397-415.
15 Wald “Punishment of War Crimes,” p. 1128. Sandra Fullerton Joireman, “Inherited Legal 
Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy,” Journal of Modern African 
Studies 39 (4) (2001): 571-596, found that former colonies that inherited common law systems 
have been “better at assuring rule of law” than those that inherited civil law systems.
16 David Wippman, “The Costs of International Justice,” American Journal of International Law 
100 (2006): 879.
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testimony, measures which were not in its Statute and do not reflect univer-
sally recognized practices.17 They are also measures that undermine the rights 
of the accused. The Tribunal’s supporters acknowledge that in some cases the 
accused might not get his “fair share of due process,” but they tend to blame 
defense counsel for flawed trials, not the rules and procedures of the Tribu-
nal, nor its prosecutors or judges.18 The ICTY’s supporters also reject sugges-
tions that its expansive rulings are detrimental to due process. They argue that 
“loose” definitions of the law are needed to assure conviction of those “re-
sponsible” for atrocities and to obtain “justice” for “victims,” and that whatever 
inequities might occur between indictment and conviction can be remedied at 
sentencing.19
However, Patricia Wald was “not entirely happy with the sentencing pro-
cedures at the ICTY,” and she was “bothered” by the practice of rendering the 
verdict at the same time as handing down the sentence, which she viewed as 
“prejudicial” to the defense because materials relevant to sentencing were sub-
mitted before the verdict. She also worried that the lack of guidance in the 
Statute—which only bars capital punishment and urges judges to “look to the 
practices” of Yugoslav courts before 1991—and the consequent lack of sen-
tencing norms for particular crimes could “undermine confidence inside and 
between international courts,” especially since judges “varied widely in their 
background, energy, and particular competencies.” But she considered them 
competent enough and willing to apply an “expansive definition of the test for 
command responsibility” that she doubted local judges would accept.20 What 
is certain is that while a majority of judges have come from civil and common 
law systems in democratic states with civil and political liberties, many have 
come from states that Freedom House ranks as “not free” and few prosecutors 
or judges knew much about the former Yugoslav state and its peoples before 
arriving in The Hague. (See Table 1)
17 Lombardi, “Legitimacy,” pp. 895-99, sees the use of written statements that “do not implicate 
the accused in a ‘critical way’” as “nonsense” because evidence that is not “probative” must be 
“prejudicial” and should be barred from consideration. 
18  Wippman, “The Costs of Justice,” p. 880, considered the “caliber” of defense counsel low. 
But they are subject to review; as UN employees, prosecutors are not. Talbert, “The ICTY and 
Defense Counsel,” pp. 975-986. 
19  Cassese, “The Proper Limits,” p. 122, sees sentencing as correcting flaws inherent in JCE. 
Meron, “Reflections,” p. 578, thinks the ICTY has “educated” and brought “justice” to the peo-
ples of former Yugoslavia.
20  Wald, “Punishment of War Crimes,” pp. 1128-33.
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Table 1. Countries of Origin and Freedom House Ratings for “Permanent” 
Judges sitting at the ICTY, 1993-2003, with 2002 Freedom House Rankings 
(Political Freedoms, Civil Liberties, Degree of “Freedom”).





Australia 1993-1997 1 1 Free
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina No judges 5 4 Partly Free
canada 1993-1997 1 1 Free
Costa Rica 1993-1998 1 2 Free
croatia No judges 2 2 Free
Egypt 1993-1995 6 6 Not Free
Italy 1993-2000 1 1 Free
Malaysia 1993-2001 5 5 Partly Free
Nigeria 1993-1998 4 5 Partly Free
Pakistan 1993-1996 6 5 Not Free
United States 1993-1999 1 1 Free
France 1994-2003 1 2 Free
Egypt 1995-2001 6 6 Not Free
Pakistan 1996-1998 6 5 Not Free
China 1997-2000 7 6 Not Free
Columbia 1997-2001 4 4 Partly Free
Guyana 1997-2009 2 2 Free
Portugal 1997-2001 1 1 Free
Zambia 1997-2001 5 4 Partly Free
Australia 1998-2003 1 1 Free
Jamaica 1998-2011 2 3 Free
Morocco 1998-2001 5 5 Partly Free
South Korea 1999-2011 2 2 Free
United States 1999-2001 1 1 Free
China 2000-2011 7 6 Not Free
Egypt 2001-2005 6 6 Not Free
Germany 2001-2008 1 2 Free
Italy 2001-2011 1 1 Free
Morocco 2001-2002 5 5 Partly Free
Netherlands 2001-2011 1 1 Free
Sri Lanka 2001-2003 3 4 Partly Free
Turkey 2001-2011 4 5 Partly Free
United States 2001-2011 1 1 Free
Yugoslavia/Serbia No judges 3 3 Partly Free
Sources: ICTY website, icty.org/sid/149; Freedom House website, freedomhouse.
org/template.cfm?page=21+year=2000
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Minna Schrag recalled that “few” members of the Tribunal’s first pros-
ecutorial staff arrived with “any knowledge, let also expertise, in matters of 
criminal law” and that most had “scant authority” for “most of the legal issues 
we confront[ed].” They had “no precedent” to follow because the Office of the 
Prosecutor at the ICTY was different from those of the post-World War II 
tribunals, so they created their own “operating procedures” and “conceptual 
framework” for such questions as whether to use “an objective or subjective 
standard” to indict and what constituted an exhibit. “Most” were “happy” sim-
ply “to create something sensible.” But even this could be difficult; when two of 
her colleagues warned her that preparing witnesses for cross-examination was 
“unethical” and perhaps “criminal,” Schrag responded that not to do so in her 
country could entail a “malpractice” suit.21 Patricia Wald recalls that she was 
recruited in the “usual Washington way,” by “a phone call from an old acquain-
tance at the State Department,” and that she arrived at the ICTY with no expe-
rience in international law, not even a law course at Yale, and with proficiency 
only in English, one of the Tribunal’s three official languages.22 In effect, both 
prosecutors and judges created rules and procedures as they went.23
They have also created new legal doctrines. As Gregory Lombardi has not-
ed, the Tribunal has “expanded its powers and jurisdiction beyond the bounds 
of its Statute” by claiming “inherent authority” from sources outside the Stat-
ute, asserting that it can ignore the Statute to achieve “fairness,” and insisting 
that it was acting with the “tacit approval” of the Security Council. Lombardi 
argues that in some instances this has also denied the accused due process 
and undermined the Tribunal’s legitimacy.24 Its chambers have selected cases 
from customary and national law in order to justify their formulation of new 
legal doctrines, but they have ignored treaty law that conflicts with human 
rights law, a practice that suggests that the judges sitting on the Tribunal view 
21 Schrag, “The Yugoslav Crimes Tribunal,” pp. 187-3.
22 English, French and Bošnjak/Croatian/Serbian are the official languages of the ICTY. Most 
judges speak English or French. Wald, “International Criminal Courts,” p. 242-3, also noted the 
inadequacy of the ICTY’s library and the difficulty she had accommodating to the hybrid system 
at the ICTY and communicating with Francophone judges and staff. She could not understand 
either her French colleagues or the “Balkan dialect” of the defendants and many of their counsel. 
Wippman, “The Costs of Justice,” p. 877, notes that in 2005, the cost of “verbatim reporting” 
during trials was $3,029,000, almost as much as the cost of judges, which was $4,162,100. The 
Language Section absorbed 10 percent of the Registry’s budget and the need for translations 
created bottlenecks.
23 The ICJ appears to suffer from similar problems; see Yehuda Z. Blum, “Consistently Incon-
sistent: The International Court of Justice and the Former Yugoslavia (Croatia v. Serbia),” Ameri-
can Journal of International Law (April 2009): 264-271.
24 Lombardi, “Legitimacy and the Expanding Power of the ICTY,” pp. 887-901, argues that the 
Appeals Chamber has both exceeded the Statute and adopted measures contrary to it, and so 
underscored its “collusion” with the UNSC. Cassese, “The Proper Limits,” p. 132, claims that an 
“expansive interpretation of Article 25 (3) (d) would be justified by the need to punish criminal 
conduct that otherwise would not be regard as culpable.”
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international law as malleable and raises questions regarding whether their 
decisions constitute binding precedents for other courts.25
Some commentators have argued that the ICTY’s expansive jurisprudence 
should be viewed as idiosyncratic rather than as a codification of universally 
accepted norms, and that the ad hoc nature of the Tribunal raises questions as 
to whether its decisions constitute binding precedent and rise to the level of 
international legal norms, particularly given its use of national case law to jus-
tify the formulation of the doctrine of “joint criminal enterprise” (JCE). David 
Ohlin notes that the notion of JCE is not codified in the ICTY Statute and he 
argues that it is not likely to become part of international practice because it 
lacks state practice and opinion juris. Two harbingers of how the international 
legal community will treat the Tribunal’s rulings have come from the Extraor-
dinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), which ruled that Tadić, 
the case for which JCE was formulated, was “wrongly decided” by the ICTY, 
and from the ICC, whose Statute includes the doctrines of “control” and “co-
perpetration” rather than JCE,26 suggesting that the latter’s “consolidation” has 
occurred primarily within the ICTY.27
25  Wald, “Punishment of War Crimes,” p. 1128. Meron, “Reflections,” p. 576-7, argues that 
the ICTY has ignored treaty law, owing to “doubts” regarding treaties, as well as their “binding 
character and reservations,” which constrict legal interpretation, and because they have been 
concluded “between belligerents.” The only treaties cited have been those that are “wholly or 
imply declaratory of customary law,” whose “generality” has given the ICTY’s judges “comfort.” 
26  The ICC’s doctrine presents its own problems. Kevin John Heller, “Retreat from Nuremberg. 
The Leadership Requirement in the Crime of Aggression,” European Journal of International 
Law 18 (3) (2007): 477-497, argues that the “control” or “direct” standard adopted by the ICC 
effectively excludes private economic actors, political leaders, and military officials complicit 
in another state’s aggression, all of whom the IMT at Nuremberg and Tokyo included. Cedric 
Ryngaert, “Litigating Abuses Committed by Private Military Companies,” European Journal of 
International Law 19 (5) (2008): 1035-1053, notes that while JCE may be a way to hold PMCs 
(Private Military Contractors) accountable for war crimes, doing so is difficult because by priva-
tizing war, power is no longer “exercised top-down, but rather horizontally and through social 
influence.”  But domestic laws can do so as well, e.g., “Blackwater Guards Indicted for 2007 
Baghdad Civilian Killings,” American Journal of International Law 103 (2) (April 2009): 360-362.
27  Jens David Ohlin, “Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes,” Chicago Journal of 
International Law 11 (2) (2011): 693-754, esp. pp. 712-713, 748-9, notes that the ICTY is an ad 
hoc court and not linked to a specific state. Cassese, “The Proper Limits,” pp. argues 110, 114-
115, 122-3, 133, argues that JCE “has passed the test of judicial scrutiny” and. is a “consolidated 
(though in some respects still controversial) concept of international criminal law” because it 
has been used by the ICTY and “other international criminal courts,” which he does not name. 
While “legal commentators have looked . . . askance” at this “darling notion” of the Prosecution,” 
he argues that it is rooted in customary international law and has been “routinely applied” at the 
ICTY and that case law has “upheld” its lower threshold of proof, as proven by decision in Tadić, 
Krstić, and Stakić. In effect, while Ohlin has noted the rejection of JCE by courts other than the 
ICTY, Cassese argues that its use at the Tribunal has effectively “consolidated” it as a principle of 
international law.
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The tenuous nature of the ICTY’s jurisprudence is to some degree the fault 
of the UNSC. The Security Council has effectively prevented the formulation 
of legal norms by using ad hoc tribunals to prosecute war crimes and crimes 
against humanity rather than creating a permanent international criminal 
court to do so. Mariano Aznar-Gómez suggests that the lack of such norms is 
in the interest of the UNSC’s permanent members, who prefer ad hoc arrange-
ments because they set no precedents. But he argues that “case-by-case” deter-
minations undermine the rule of law by giving the most powerful states carte 
blanche to do as they please, thanks to the repeated appearance of the phrase 
“all means necessary” in UNSC resolutions.28 Andrea Bianchi notes that while 
the UNSC exercises “quasi-judicial functions,” it is not a judicial body but rath-
er a “political organ” that is “heavily influenced by political contingencies” and 
“dependent on the . . . will of the [Security Council’s] permanent members.” 
She argues that using ad hoc tribunals “makes it difficult to exercise scrutiny 
over the conduct of international actors.”29 The ICTY thus seems to be a crimi-
nal court created for political reasons, given that it derives its legitimacy from 
an executive council whose permanent members can veto resolutions which 
they do not approve.
The ICTY also appears to be a court that administers transitional justice. 
Its supporters view both the Tribunal and its jurisprudence as models for fu-
ture courts, in particular for the International Criminal Court (ICC), because 
they believe that its chambers have furthered the development of international 
law by rendering important decisions and by crafting new legal doctrines like 
JCE and resurrecting older ones like command responsibility. They claim that 
it has rendered justice to victims of the wars and that it has had a significant 
impact on the international system in general and on the successor states in 
particular, where it has supposedly contributed to the consolidation of the rule 
of law, helped to reconcile former enemies, and furthered the development of 
civil society. Some even claim that the Tribunal has contributed to the creation 
28  The phrase was most recently used in UNSC Resolution 1973, which has allowed NATO 
to argue that providing close air support for one side in a civil war, including the bombing of 
cities, was “necessary” to protect civilians from air and artillery bombardment. Mariano J. Azar-
Gómez, “A Decade of Human Rights Protection by the UN Security Council: A Sketch of De-
regulation?” European Journal of International Law 13 (1) (2002): 223-241, esp. pp. 224, 233, 235 
The UNSC has authorized the use of force in the successor states to Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, 
Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, and East Timor, but not in Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo. It 
has created ad hoc tribunals for the successor states to Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.
29  Andrea Bianchi, “Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law,” European Journal of International Law 13 
(1) (2002):  264-272, concludes that the UNSC can become “the ultimate guarantor of certain 
fundamental interests of the international community,” but only “if the cases are treated alike, if 
clear objectives are set and their achievement pursued consistently. . . .” Adam Roberts, “Imple-
mentation of the Laws of War in Late 20th-Century Conflicts. Part I,” Security Dialogue 29 (2) 
(1998): 141-2, notes that “states prefer . . . ad hoc arrangements” to treaty obligations because 
they are not legally binding.
Review of Croatian History 7/2011, no.1, 153 - 200
163
of “permanent peace” in the region and that it has been able to tell the “truth” 
about the Yugoslav wars.30 These are all, of course, activities that are essentially 
political and diplomatic, marking the Tribunal as a court of transitional justice.
They are also results that are more often asserted than demonstrated, and 
Jonathan Charney has questioned whether international criminal tribunals 
can have a positive impact on “peaceful” transitions, particularly since the 
ICTY has ruled out the use of “immunities,” which are among the tools that 
have been used to ease “national reconciliation.” He wonders whose interests 
are served by replacing “immunities” and “truth and reconciliation commis-
sions” with international criminal tribunals. The answer seems to be those of 
the UNSC, which has determined that criminal courts are better choices than 
truth and reconciliation commissions. But reconciliation is difficult following 
a conflict, and Kaminsky, Nalepa, and O’Neill argue that both criminal tribu-
nals and truth commissions have undermined reconciliation and transitions 
to democratic regimes, a conclusion reinforced by studies of both in Sierra 
Leone.31 The ICTY may thus actually have subverted the transition in the for-
mer Yugoslav republics, especially given that while its verdicts have satisfied its 
judges, its prosecutors, and members of the “international community,” they 
have not reassured everyone in the successor states. For two decades the ICTY 
has kept open wounds caused by the wars of secession and the antagonisms 
30 McDonald, “The International Criminal Tribunal,” claimed that “the Tribunal is essential for 
peace, real peace, both in the former Yugoslavia and beyond.” Barria and Roper, “How Effective 
Are International Criminal Tribunals?” pp. 349, 350, 354, note that international tribunals exist 
in order to “deter future atrocities”; “reintegrate societies” through reconciliation; and “provide 
for international peace and security.” Saxon, “Exporting Justice,” p. 563, thinks the ICTY “has 
played an important role” in healing wounds and “forcing entire communities  . . . to confront 
the worst parts of their histories” and “may prevent history from repeating itself.” James Upcher, 
“Politics and Justice at the ICTY,” Deakin Law Review 10 (2) (2005): 804-814, argued that the 
ICTY must play a “political role” and provide “justice for the victims” of war crimes in order 
to restore confidence in the rule of law because “the foremost, essential function of criminal 
prosecution [is] to restore confidence in the rule of law.” By trying and convicting the accused, 
he believes that the ICTY also helps to “demystify history’s claim to be the authentic motor of 
conflict” [sic!] and to “unravel the historical narratives spun by cynical elites for political gain.” 
He therefore applauds the use of the ICTY for political purposes, even though it is formally “a 
judicial tool.” Like Geoffrey Robertson, he thinks that the creation of the ICTY marked a “seis-
mic shift from diplomacy to legality in the conduct of international affairs,” and he approves 
Lawrence Eagleburger’s observation that the ICTY is “an example of the way in which law was 
used for political ends to disrupt the attempt [by diplomats] to find a negotiated peace” in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, a disruption that resulted in two more years of killing in that country.
31 Jonathan I. Charney, “Progress in International Law?” American Journal of International 
Law, 93 (2) (1999): 458-9; Kaminski, Nalepa, and O’Neill, “Normative and Strategic Aspects of 
Transitional Justice,” pp. 295-6, 298-9; Nancy Amoury Combs, “Testimonial Deficiencies and 
Evidentiary Uncertainties in International Criminal Trials,” UCLA Journal of International Law 
and Foreign Affairs 14 (1) (2009): 235-274; and Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Wrong-Sizing Interna-
tional Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone,” Fordham International Law Journal 29 (3) 
(2006): 472-506. Also Roberts, “Implementation,” pp. 144-6.
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occasioned by them, a result Gregory Lombardi believes has severely eroded 
the “social legitimacy” of the Tribunal.32
The political, diplomatic, and public relations activities carried out by the 
Tribunal’s prosecutors and judges also mark it as a transitional court. Those 
who view these tribunals as a force for good do so as well, but they downplay 
the non-judicial functions of the tribunals and argue that they are anchored 
in liberal theory and embody “legal” rather than “political” models. Such ar-
guments confuse legality with morality and treat liberalism as a determinate 
variable.33 But Frédéric Mégret argues that liberalism is determinate only if “it 
affected the decision to create the tribunal per se.” However, he argues that it 
did not do so. Rather, once the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recast 
as an “ethical” question following reports of Serb concentration camps, pub-
lic opinion in the West had to be given the “impression” that something was 
being done, and the Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia was 
that something. Leaders then raised the “moral stakes” regarding the war and 
found themselves pushed to create the ICTY as “liberal ingenuity” and “realist 
interest” led to a “diplomatic discourse” that was “gradually distorted by the 
rhetoric of morality” and then “by that of international criminal law.” Mégret 
dismisses arguments that liberal states create international criminal tribunals 
because they are prone to do so as circular and concludes that states create 
such courts “to legitimize their goals and because they think or know they can 
control them.” It is therefore not norms that constrain power, but rather power 
that establishes norms that it finds useful.34
32 Lombardi, “Legitimacy,” pp. 899-900, notes that the claim by Slobodan Milošević that the 
Tribunal is merely a “political tool” appeals to “a number of people, many of whom reside in the 
former Yugoslavia where it is arguably most important for the Tribunal to be seen as legitimate.” 
But while the “glacial” pace of the trials have undermined the ICTY’s social legitimacy, new rules 
to expedite them have further undercut its legitimacy.
33 Christopher Rudolf, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribu-
nals,” International Organization 55 (3) (2001): 655-691, esp. p. 656, 660, 665, notes that advo-
cates of international tribunals see each as “a mechanism of peace, of establishing justice and 
promoting reconciliation in war-torn regions.” But he argues that if “liberal humanitarian ideas 
have created the demand for political action, the process of dealing with brutality in war has 
been dominated by realpolitik [sic], that is, furthering the strategic interests of the most power-
ful states,” and that the ICTY was “politically inexpensive” and “illustrates the strategic interests 
of powerful states” acting through the UNSC, which effectively controlled the Tribunal.
34 Mégrét, “The Politics of International Criminal Tribunals,” pp. 1267-74, 1283-4, discerns 
“a form of realist interest” in the formation of the ICTY and  concedes  liberalism a place “in 
an overall theory of interest formation” because liberal “political culture” might shape the self-
interest that “dictates whether states support international criminal tribunals.” But he notes that 
liberal polities constrain “what can and cannot be said publicly” and that “a theory that says 
that only liberal states are likely to create rule-of-law war crimes trials is not exactly norm-free.” 
Mégret did not see the ICC as a “remedy to the selectivity associated with ad hoc tribunals,” and 
speculated that the reluctance of major powers to join it might “displace the problem of selectiv-
ity, transferring it from the ‘external’ one of tribunal creation to the ‘internal’ one of caseload 
selection.” Schabas, “Victor’s Justice,” passim, argues that this has indeed occurred at the ICC.
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José Alvarez also questions the link between liberal theory and interna-
tional law, noting that there is little basis for viewing either as universal, espe-
cially since liberal theorists and politicians brand some states as “illegitimate” 
and beyond the “zone of law.” He argues that liberal theory is actually illiberal 
because liberal states are intolerant of non-“democratic” states, define an “ideal 
society” narrowly, and resist “real progressive reforms.”35 Marttí Koskenniemi 
accepts a link between liberalism and international law, but he argues that in-
ternational law is essentially a judicial “tradition” peculiar to the “West,” much 
like wearing a tie on formal occasions, and so best understood as “kitsch”—a 
“lie to curtain off death.” Europe has “often” made the mistake of thinking that 
its particular traditions are universal, but Koskenniemi thinks that when “a 
particular tradition” pretends to “speak in the name of humanity” that is “the 
stuff of colonialism.” NATO may have claimed to be acting on behalf of the 
“international community” when it bombed Serbia in 1999, but India was not 
convinced, and Koskenniemi finds the realist critique useful because it “re-
minds us that, in law, political struggle is waged on what legal words such as 
‘aggression,’ ‘self-determination,’ ‘self-defense,’ ‘terrorist,’ or ‘jus cogens’ mean, 
whose policy they will include, and whose they will exclude.” To set the law 
against “the barbarism of politics” is therefore to ignore the reality that the real 
choice is “not between law and politics, but between one politics of law and 
another.”36
If so, then to view the ICTY as following either a legal or a political model 
is misleading because it does both.37 If the Tribunal is so independent that 
no influence can be brought to bear on it, then it is a legal bureaucracy that 
will pursue its own interests. That its sentences are consistent with the indict-
ments brought by its prosecutors and that its rules and procedures are typical 
of independent judiciaries mean little except that it functions like a court of 
law. As Kenneth Abbott notes, it is typical for judges and prosecutors to “view 
courts and other legal institutions—even in politically charged areas like hu-
man rights—as apolitical.” But judges and prosecutors pursue various inter-
ests, including “pure self-interest, such as professional prestige and power,” and 
“[s]upranational judges” can “select cases and interpret agreements in ways 
that develop doctrine in desired directions and by doing so gain allies at the 
national level” and “reshape politics as well as law.” Judges at the ICTY also 
35 José E. Alvarez, “Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory,” 
European Journal of International Law 12 (2) (2001): 183-246.
36 Marttí Koskenniemi, “International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal,” Euro-
pean Journal of International Law 16 (1) (2005): 114-119, 122-3, likens “US attitudes to law” to 
those of “early twentieth-century Germany” and discerns a “hegemonic” element in Europe’s 
support of international law. 
37 Meernik, “Victor’s Justice,” pp. 144-50, argues that the congruity of sentences and indict-
ments suggests that legally “relevant” variables determines the outcome, but the Office of Pros-
ecution determines the gravity of the indictments, so that is the first place a historian would look 
for political influence.
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can do so, and both its judges and its prosecutors “have worked tirelessly to 
create an international ‘community of law’” to support the Tribunal. “Custom-
ary law” is one of the “strongest political tools” in their tool chest, especially 
when wed to selected cases from domestic law.38 Realists therefore reject argu-
ments that draw a clear line between the legal and the political as untenable 
and argue that the ICTY is a political institution as much as it is a judicial one. 
Dan Saxon, who worked for the Prosecution, embraces the political nature 
of the Tribunal and argues that “[t]he suggestion . . . that the law is somehow 
divorced from politics is naïve. Law is only an extension of politics, and if well-
reasoned legal decisions can create more favorable condition for the respect of 
human rights, there seems nothing inappropriate for using the law as such a 
benevolent tool.”39
It thus seems reasonable to assume that the Tribunal’s decisions are to 
some extent political, given its provenance and its mandate; the problem is 
to determine to what extent. One measure is to examine the “situations” in 
which the UNSC has intervened in order to protect human rights, because 
while human rights have been codified in treaties, their application has been 
haphazard and the choice of “situations” in which to intervene appears to be 
political.40 The ICTY was ostensibly created by the UNSC in 1993 to render 
justice to all victims of the wars of secession, but in practice it initially indicted 
more Serbs and Croats for crimes committed against Muslims in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina than Muslims for crimes committed against Serbs and Croats, or 
Serbs for crimes committed against Croats, or Croats for crimes committed 
against Serbs. Initially, it did not indict for crimes committed by Serbs against 
Croats in Croatia, even though the war in Croatia preceded the one in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. In James Meernik’s sample of the first thirty-two sentences 
handed down by the Tribunal, there are only four Muslims, and they were ac-
cused of war crimes, not of the “more serious” crimes against humanity and 
genocide. The Trial Chambers convicted three of the four Muslims indicted, 
a rate of 75 percent, but ten of the eleven Croats, a little over 90 percent, and 
all of the seventeen Serbs.41 This early pattern of indictments and convictions 
appears to have reflected the claim that Muslims were the only “bona fide” 
victims of the wars in Yugoslavia,42 and Patricia Wald’s belief that the Tribunal 
38 Abbott, “International Theory, International Law,” pp. 376-8. John Hagan and Ron Levi, 
“Crimes of War and the Force of Law, Social Forces 83(4) (2005): 1499-1534, note that judges and 
prosecutors “drive” the ICTY, where defendants and their counsel are “outsiders,” and speculate 
that her colleagues supported Louise Arbour’s policy of “sealed” (secret) indictments because it 
“promised to generate arrests and therefore trials.”
39 Saxon, “Exporting Justice,” p. 569.
40 Schabas, “Victor’s Justice,” pp. 535-552; Adams, “Implementation,” pp. 137-46.
41 Meernik, “Victor’s Justice or the Law?” 150, 154-5, 157, does not examine the “subjective” 
factors in how judges evaluate evidence and excuses plea bargains as necessary for “judicial ef-
ficiency.”
42 James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (Montreal: Mc-
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had been created to render justice to the Muslim victims of atrocities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.43 She also believed that judges needed to guard against “un-
conscious assumptions of guilt.”44 Whether they harbor such assumptions, at 
least one judge appears to have considered a Muslim witness who had served 
in the Bosnian military to be a victim rather than a participant in the wars,45 a 
view that is reflected in concerns that witnesses be protected and in the deci-
sion to keep the identity of some witnesses from both the defendant and his 
counsel.46 Judges also tend to be active, given that in the cases examined by 
Meernik, the more witnesses summoned by the judges in the Trial Chambers, 
the more likely a conviction.47
Nonetheless, the Tribunal’s prosecutors view themselves as even-handed 
because they have indicted members of all sides.48 Even so, as noted above, 
the ratio of Muslims indicted and convicted relative to Serbs and Croats was 
skewed during the first six years of the Tribunal’s history, and it was not until 
1999 that it began to indict Serbs for crimes committed in Croatia. Even if 
prosecutors have been even-handed in issuing indictments, this only would 
suggest that they accept the theory of “moral equivalence,” which posits that 
all sides bore equal responsibility for what occurred during the wars, a theory 
viewed by many as a way to avoid assigning responsibility for having initiated 
the conflicts and for what occurred afterward. However, while prosecutors and 
judges can adjudicate responsibility for specific crimes, they cannot examine 
Gill-Queens University Press, 2003), pp. 242-5, argued that “Bosnians were bona fide victims” 
who had “fought bravely,” unlike Croats, who merely implemented a strategy of victimhood and 
tricked Serb forces into attacking them, then joined the Serbs to victimize Bosnian Muslims. 
Gow claims that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was “always outgunned” by Serb and 
Croat forces; Charles R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military His-
tory, 1992-1994 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), passim, disagrees.
43 Wald, “International Criminal Courts,” p. 242, believed that the Tribunal was created to right 
wrongs done to Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina because its Statute gave it jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia “on or after 1 Jan. 1991 (the beginning 
of the Bosnian conflict).” [Sic=the “war” in Bosnia and Herzegovina began is generally consid-
ered to have begun in the spring of 1992.]
44 Wald, “Punishment of War Crimes,” p. 1131.
45 Judge Antonetti interrupted defense counsel to remind him that “[t]his woman . . . is a vic-
tim.” ICTY, Trial Transcripts, Prlić, et al., 6 and 9 May 2006, p. 1189.
46 See discussion in Monroe Leigh, “The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses against 
Accused,” American Journal of International Law 90 (2) (1996): 235-238, and “Witness Ano-
nymity is Inconsistent with Due Process,” American Journal of International Law 91 (1) (1997): 
80-83, his response to Christine M. Chinkin, “Due Process and Witness Anonymity,” American 
Journal of International Law 91 (1) (1997): 75-79, who argued that anonymity is necessary to 
“protect” witnesses from those in the docket.
47 Meernik, “Victor’s Justice or the Law?” p. 153.
48 The lead prosecutor in Prlić, et al., argued that the ICTY could not be accused of being anti-
Croat because it had indicted leaders from “all sides.” ICTY, Trial Transcript, Prlić, et al., 26 April 
2006, pp. 902-904. 
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the causes of the wars because the ICTY’s mandate limits them to examining 
the period after 1 January 1991 and its Statues excludes crimes against peace, 
which James O’Brien thought were “appropriately omitted from the Yugoslav 
statute” because “[t]heir inclusion would almost inevitably require the tribunal 
to investigate the causes of the conflict itself (and the justifications issued by 
the combatants), which would involve the tribunal squarely in the political is-
sues surrounding the conflict.”49
However, the Office of the Prosecution (OTP) appears to have gone be-
yond the limits of the Statute because it has used the doctrine of JCE to at-
tribute “intention” to specific leaders and argue that they were responsible for 
both the wars and the crimes that accompanied them. At the same time, its 
refusal to apply the doctrine of JCE to NATO leaders for the deaths of civilians 
during its bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999 has encouraged some to view 
the Tribunal as a political court.50 Other indications that the ICTY is a court of 
transitional justice are its use of broad indictments, its expansive judicial deci-
sions, and its formulation of novel legal doctrines that facilitate conviction. 
The Appeals Chamber has employed broad interpretations of customary law 
to overturn convictions by Trial Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor has 
brought broad indictments, and its judges have favored broad interpretations 
of existing law, in particular the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, which 
makes individuals liable for the actions of other members of a group, rather 
than for crimes which they themselves committed.51
49 O’Brien, “The International Tribunal,” pp. 639, 645, 
50 Michael Mandel, “Politics and Human Rights in International Criminal Law: Our Case 
against NATO and the Lessons to Learned from It,” Fordham International Law Journal 25 (5) 
(2002): 95-128, concluded that the ICTY’s failure to indict NATO showed it to be “corrupt”; 
Tarcisio Gazzini, “NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992-1999),” Eu-
ropean Journal of International Law 12 (3) (2001), pp. 391-436, argues that NATO repudiated 
UNSC control in 1999; and Anthony J. Colangelo, “Manipulating International Criminal Proce-
dure: The Decision of the ICTY Office of the Independent Prosecutor not to Investigate NATO 
Bombing in the Former Yugoslavia,” Northwestern University Law Review 97 (3) (2003):1393-
1436, was persuaded that NATO could have been indicted for the deaths of civilians during the 
coalition’s bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, and while he reluctantly approved Carla Del 
Ponte’s decision not to do so, he argued that it suggested “that ulterior motives” were in play and 
that the decision “erodes the sense of justice basic to any independent prosecutorial decision.” 
Danner and Martinez, “Guilty Associations,” pp. 24-6, note that it is possible to indict for simple 
negligence under JCE category 3, which means that Del Ponte could have indicted both the 
pilots who flew the missions and the members of NATO’s command. David Wippman, “Kosovo 
and the Limits of International Law,” Fordham International Law Journal 25 (5) (2002):129-151, 
acknowledges the illegality of NATO’s intervention but argues that a “breach” of international 
law by NATO is “acceptable” if done for “humanitarian reasons,” and if several countries support 
it, even if the UNSC does not do so.
51 Lee A. Casey, “The Case against the International Criminal Court,” Fordham International 
Law Journal 25 (3) (March 2002): 847-50, 858-60, 865-6. Casey worked at the ICTY and sees 
the ICC as similarly prone to expansive interpretations of international law. He cited Louise 
Arbour’s comment that “there is more to fear from an impotent than from an overreaching 
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The ICTY’s transitional nature explains in part its effort to write the history 
of the wars of secession.52 To punish specific individuals for specific crimes 
would satisfy retributive notions of justice, but it would not confirm the rule 
of law, save in a narrow sense, and it would not discredit the governments and 
militaries that fought those wars, merely the individuals found guilty. But the 
ICTY aspires to do more than render justice; it intends to reshape the political 
cultures and civil societies of the region by writing the history of the wars.53 
To do so, it has indicted and convicted military and civilian leaders who were 
not directly tied to specific crimes, and it has embraced an increasingly expan-
sive reading of the law. Its broad indictments have effectively inculpated whole 
governments and militaries, not merely individuals.54 The ICTY thus functions 
as much like a transitional court as it does a criminal court, and transitional 
courts are by definition political.55
Telling the Truth
The ICTY has electronically archived its indictments, decisions, and judg-
ments, as well as documents and testimony, and these are available on line.56 
Prosecutor” at the ICTY, and he concluded that similar tribunals cannot be trusted to “control” 
themselves.
52 Wippman, “The Costs of Justice,” p. 875, argues that the trials are complex, owing to the na-
ture of the crimes, but it is the doctrines of JCE and persecution that render the crimes complex 
and entail discussion of the conflict’s nature. Wippman  acknowledges  indirectly this by not-
ing that broad investigations and indictments result from the ICTY’s “mandate” and its “goals,” 
which “include fostering accountability, deterring future atrocities, providing acknowledgement 
to victims, and building a historical record of the conflict.” [Emphasis added] 
53 ICTY Press Release, “ICTY President McDonald Addresses the Security Council, 20 Oct. 
1998. McDonald appeared to argue that international law has precedent over domestic (“. . .it 
is a recognized principle of international law that States may not rely on their domestic law to 
thwart their international obligations.”) and that the ICTY was writing history (“We must learn 
from the lessons of the past, lest they be repeated.”).  Also “The International Criminal Tribunal,” 
13 May 1999, for her declaration that “the Tribunal is essential for peace, real peace, both in the 
former Yugoslavia and beyond.”
54 Allison M. Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law,” International 
Law Workshop, University of California, Berkeley, 2004, Paper 3, pp. 56-7, note that “when faced 
with decisions about how to limit the potential scope of JCE, international judges have most 
frequently elected the most expansive interpretation of the doctrine.” They argue that judges at 
the ICTY have not “seriously grappled with the question of how to define limits on the scope of 
JCEs,” because they “have permitted prosecutors to argue for conviction based on a JCE theory 
even where it was not alleged in the indictment” and “allowed even the most extended forms of 
JCE to be used for the specific intent crimes of genocide and persecution.”
55 Kaminski, Nalepa, and O’Neill, “Normative and Strategic Aspects,” p. 295.
56 For a discussion of expert testimony and the difficulties in using the records at the ICTY, 
see Ksenija Turković, “Historians in Search for Truth about Conflicts in the Territory of Former 
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Such an abundance of information so easily available is clearly of interest to 
those seeking to understand the events that occurred during the 1990s on 
the territories of the successor states to Yugoslavia. Dermot Groome, a for-
mer prosecutor at the Tribunal, believes that the ICTY is engaged in a “truth-
seeking,” and others insist that it is fulfilling a “truth-telling” role similar to 
that of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, even if Carla 
del Ponte is aware that the ICTY cannot tell the whole truth about the wars, 
and the Trial Chamber in Nikolić considered the historian to be the “the final 
arbiter of historical fact.”  Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber, like Ms. Ponte and 
many of the ICTY’s former officials and supporters believed that it was helping 
to establish “the truth about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.”57 “Truth-
telling” has a historical function because it establishes what happened and who 
did what to whom, so if the Tribunal can tell the truth, then its decisions and 
transcripts should be a reliable source of information for historians.58
However, there are reasons to question the selection and quality of infor-
mation amassed by the Prosecution and the “truth” that it and the judges sit-
ting on the Tribunal’s chambers have told. Although Security Council created 
a criminal tribunal because it was persuaded that an ad hoc court is better able 
to tell the truth than a truth commission, in Sierra Leone some of those asked 
to testify at the truth commission demurred because they were worried that 
their testimony might be used to prosecute them at the Special Court for Si-
erra Leone (SCSL), a criminal tribunal.59 Truth-telling is not a straightforward 
activity, especially if criminal sanctions are attached to doing so. It tends to be 
a Platonic ideal more than a practical achievement, and the ICTY’s website in-
cludes caveats regarding the truth contained in the documents archived on it.60
Yugoslavia as Expert Witnesses in front of the ICTY, Časopis za survremenu povijest 36 (1) 
(2004): 41-67. I limit my comments to the website, which can be accessed easily by the reader 
and by historians unable to do research in The Hague. See http://www.icty.org/. Confidential 
records are not included, but the website contains between 150,000 and 190,000 public records, 
including arrest warrants, exhibits, and final judgments.
57 Dermot Groome, “The Right to Truth in the Fight against Impunity,” Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 29 (1) (2011): 175-199, esp. p. 186; Caroline Tosh, “Del Ponte: Serious Chal-
lenges in Search for Truth,” TU No. 490, 23 February 2007, reported that Carla Del Ponte ac-
knowledged that tribunals like the ICTY “cannot establish all truth and all facts.”
58 Ralph Henham, “Plea Bargaining and the Legitimacy of International Trial Justice: Some 
Observations on the Dragan Nikolic Sentencing Judgment of the ICTY,” International Criminal 
Law Review (2005): 603-604. 
59 Abbott, “International Theory,” p. 373; Groome, “The Right to Truth,” p. 186; Combs, “Testi-
monial Deficiencies and Evidentiary Uncertainties,” pp. 235-274.
60 See http://www.icty.org/. Some materials are available on the site without registering, but 
those wishing to access the court records are required to register and electronically sign a user’s 
agreement which includes “conditions” and “restrictions” regarding the use of the materials 
archived on line, e.g., the site is only for the user’s “personal, non-commercial use,” and users 
cannot “resell,” “redistribute,” or “compile” the documents on the site, nor “create derivative 
works” from them. The “UN-ICTY” which administers the site, makes no “warranties or 
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Those who tell the truth also can be intolerant of those who question the 
truth they tell. For example, in 2005 Carla Del Ponte defined the massacre of 
Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica a decade earlier as “genocide” and insisted 
that anyone who disagreed with her was engaged in a “denial of the truth.” 
She also claimed that during and immediately after Operation Storm “[o]ver 
100.000 Serb civilians were forced to leave [Croatia] and several hundreds were 
killed,” and that “the lootings [sic] and destructions [sic] of property . . . made 
the return of refugees almost impossible.” She therefore dismissed Croatian 
celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the military offensive that had ended 
a long war and liberated Croatian territory that had been occupied by Serb 
rebels for four years as an “example of how to create a selective memory.” She 
also accused the Catholic Church of “adding legitimacy to visions of history 
which are twisted in accordance with nationalist biases,” and she lamented the 
tendency of political leaders to create “myths.” She then recommended that the 
truths that the Tribunal’s judges and prosecutors tell should be integrated into 
future textbooks in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina because“[t]
he process of creating collective memories must not be left to those forces that 
deny the truth and create myths and heroes.”61 In effect, she was claiming that 
prosecutors and judges not only tell the truth, but that there is no other truth 
to tell.
representations as to the accuracy or completeness” of the materials on the site, and “periodically 
adds, changes, improves or updates” them “without notice.” The UN-ICTY does not “represent 
or endorse the accuracy or reliability of any advice, opinion, statement or other information 
provided by any information provider, any User of this Site or any other person or entity.” The 
UN-ICTY exempts itself from any liability regarding use of the site. If users are dissatisfied in 
any way, their “sole and exclusive remedy is to discontinue using the Site.” The UN-ICTY also 
reserves the right “in its sole discretion to alter, limit or discontinue the Site or any Materials 
in any respect,” and rejects any “obligation to take the needs of any User into consideration in 
connection therewith.” It also “reserves the right to deny in its sole discretion any user access to 
this Site or any portion thereof without notice.”
61 Carla Del Ponte, Keynote Speech, Annual Conference of Political Affairs Division IV, “Ci-
vilian Peace Building and Human Rights in South-East Europe” Bern, 1 September 2005. Del 
Ponte suggested that the ICTY can provide the raw data for future histories and that prosecu-
tors, judges, and NGOs are better able to tell the truth about the past than political or religious 
leaders and historians. There are echoes of Ranke in her remarks and the implication that un-
elected entities (NGOs) should have precedence over elected entities (governments).
 “Truth is at the core of justice. Judgments are based on proven facts, and it is the task of the 
prosecutor to provide solid evidence proving the responsibility of an accused in the crimes for 
which he is indicted. Therefore, in the course of its existence, the Tribunal has accumulated a 
formidable wealth of documentary evidence. It must serve to generate an accurate perception 
of what really happened during that dark decade in the former Yugoslavia. But truth cannot be 
accepted if imposed from outside. Governments and NGOs should for once join forces and use 
the millions of pages presented in court to write history as it really happened. NGOs in Belgrade, 
Sarajevo and Zagreb are working on this. Their efforts must be supported, also by the respective 
governments.” (Emphasis added.)
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If she was correct and all the truths worth knowing have been told by the 
ICTY’s judges and prosecutors, then the arguments presented by the defense, 
like those offered by others who interpret the events of the wars of secession 
differently, must be something other than the truth.62 If the only truth is the 
Tribunal’s truth, then William Schabas, President of the International Associa-
tion of Genocide Scholars, would have to be counted among those who deny 
the truth because while he has no doubts that the murder of Bosnian Muslims 
at Srebrenica was mass murder, he does not agree that it genocide.63 Nikica 
Barić, a Croatian historian who has written a carefully documented history 
of the RSK (Republika Srpska Krajina), would also be counted among those 
who deny Del Ponte’s truth because he concludes, based on his reading of cap-
tured RSK documents, that the Serb rebel leaders in Knin, not the Croatian 
government in Zagreb, were responsible for the exodus of Serbs from Croatia 
in August 1995.64 Like Barić, James Gow, who worked for the Prosecution, has 
argued that Operation Storm was not a Croat victory but rather a Serb with-
drawal organized from Belgrade, which “mobilized” both civilians and mili-
tary units “to flee” the “Krajina” in August 1995.65 Even Alan Tieger, the lead 
prosecutor in Gotovina, et al., noted that the RSK had ordered the evacuation 
of civilians before the Croatian Army attacked and that most were on their way 
before Croat troops entered Knin. But the Prosecution still argues that their 
flight was the result of a joint criminal enterprise.66
62 The wars that occurred on the territories of the component states of Yugoslavia between 1990 
and 1999 were wars of secession and of succession. Two republics (Serbia and Montenegro) 
aspired to “succeed” the Yugoslav state, while three others (Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia) 
sought to “secede” from the federation. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a special case because its 
Muslim leaders sought to keep it within Yugoslavia, while its Croatian leaders tended to follow 
Zagreb’s lead and its Serbian leaders that of Belgrade. The wars in Yugoslavia are hard to catego-
rize because they were civil wars (between nationalities), international wars (between states), 
revolutionary wars (to alter the internal political, economic, and social systems of the republics), 
and ideological wars (to determine the internal organization and ideologies of the successor 
and secessionist states). They were thus both wars of succession (to the Yugoslav state) and of 
secession (from the Yugoslav state). For typology, see Stanley G. Payne, Civil War in Europe, 
1905-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 1-12.
63 William A. Schabas, “Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First Judg-
ments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Fordham International 
Law Journal 25 (3) (2002): 23-53.
64 Nikica Barić, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.B1995. (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička 
knjiga, 2005), pp. 514-528, 533-551, 558, 562-563, notes that Serb leaders discussed large-scale 
evacuations in 1993 and made the decision to evacuate the RSK’s Serbs on 4 August 1995, a day 
before the Croatian Army entered Knin and two days before Franjo Tuđman visited the city. 
Also Davor Marijan, “Hrvatsko ratište 1990.–1995.,” and Dražen Živić, “Demografski okvir,” in 
Zdenko Radelić, Davor Marijan, Nikica Barić, Albert Bing, and Dražen Živić, Stvaranje hrvatske 
drave i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), esp. pp. 97–129, 458–80.
65 Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries, pp. 169-70.
66 Alan Tieger, Opening Statement, 10 March 2008, pp. 3, 26, began his opening argument 
by noting that the trial of Gotovina and two other Croatian generals “arises from the forcible 
elimination of Krajina’s Serbs and the destruction of their community in August 1995.” He later 
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Mr. Tieger’s truth, like that of Ms. del Ponte, is not Platonic Truth, nor is it 
the complex truth of a historian; it is the narrow “legal” truth of a particular in-
ternational court whose broad interpretations of the law have been under fire 
from legal scholars for several years because they have significantly extended 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal beyond its Statute and drastically diluted the 
requirements for mens rea in criminal trials. To assume that the ICTY’s pros-
ecutors tell the truth and that its judges establish the truth is to assume that 
prosecutors and judges are better able to evaluate evidence than any other pro-
fessionals, an assumption that most historians and more than a few lawyers 
would question.67 It is also to imply that that they should enjoy primacy over 
all others in “truth-telling,” including not only defense attorneys but also histo-
rians and social scientists, an assumption not even all courts would support.68
The Magic Bullet
Since 1999, prosecutors have disposed of the legal doctrine of “joint crimi-
nal enterprise” (JCE), which enables them to finesse the fallibility of witnesses 
and a lack of written documentation because defendants can be convicted 
for crimes that they neither committed nor intended. Within five years, JCE 
became the dominant prosecutorial strategy at the Tribunal, confirming the 
ICTY as a court of transitional justice.69 To convict, two of the three judges 
claimed that RSK authorities had planned the evacuation of Serb civilians but did not order it 
until twelve hours after the first shells hit Knin on 4 August, at about 4 p.m.
67 Ultimately, teasing the truth from the evidence is a subjective exercise, even if the person 
doing it seeks to maintain his objectivity. Meernik, “Victor’s Justice,” 150, notes that “[t]he truth-
fulness of a witness, the significance of a document, and the credibility of an intercepted com-
munication are ultimately subjective.”
68 Judges hearing defamation cases brought against historians usually avoid discussing “the 
truth value of the offending statement” because “they are particularly sensitive to the argument 
that historical truth should be settled by historians . . . [and] not by judges. . . .” They seek only 
to determine whether historians “acted in good faith, took reasonable care, displayed intellectual 
honesty, applied professional methods carefully and objectively . . . and their statements were 
part of a serious historical debate.” See Antoon de Baets, “Defamation Cases against Historians,” 
History and Theory 41 (3) (2002): 346-366, esp. p. 356.
69 Danner and Martinez, “Guilty Associations,” p. 58, note that as of 2004 the dominant doc-
trine in the prosecutorial armory at the ICTY was “joint criminal enterprise,” which is a tool 
of transitional justice because a “focus on prosecuting the senior political leadership is a dis-
tinguishing hallmark of the transitional trial” and this doctrine allows prosecutors to inculpate 
leaders in the actions of subordinates over whom they have no control. According to the Pros-
ecution, the Appeals Chamber formulated the doctrine in order “to extend responsibility as co-
perpetrators of a crime to those who, situated at the highest echelons of power, were removed 
from the actual perpetration of the offence, but had been deeply involved in its organisation 
and execution.” Danner and Martinez speculate that the “desire to describe political or military 
leaders as perpetrators of joint criminal enterprises owes much to the didactic and political 
functions of the Tribunals described in the transitional justice literature.” In other words, the 
doctrine of JCE was formulated to assure that “big fish” would be both indicted and convicted, 
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on a Trial Chamber must be persuaded that a reasonable person could have 
foreseen that crimes might occur as a result of a “common plan,” even if the 
defendant had not done so. The new doctrine replaced the “subjective” stan-
dard (“actually foresaw”) usually used in criminal cases with an “objective” one 
(“ought to have foreseen”). By doing so, it lowered the evidentiary bar for the 
prosecution but raised it for the defense because the objective standard im-
plies “a form of strict liability” that divorces culpability from causation and all 
but guarantees convictions. This is a departure from the jurisprudence of the 
postwar tribunals in Germany, which applied subjective standards to establish 
mens rea, taking into account the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the 
crime. Antonio Cassese, President of the Tribunal until 1997, recognizes that 
the “foreseeability standard” establishes a lower threshold to prove intent and 
that it is neither precise nor reliable because it is “somewhat loose as a penal 
law category of culpability and causation.” He also acknowledges that it “may 
not be admissible” when a crime committed outside the common purpose re-
quires special intent, e.g., crimes against humanity, persecution, genocide, and 
aggression. However, he rejects “most criticism” of the doctrine and claims 
that it only “needs some qualification or precision.” He argues that while the 
need to link mens rea to the crime is important, it not necessary to demand 
more than a “possible” “causal link” between intent and the crime because the 
“extreme gravity” and “massive” nature of the crimes in question allow judges 
to “legitimately expect” that participants were “particularly alert to the pos-
sible consequences of their actions.” He also thinks that a lower standard is 
justified for  “considerations of public policy,” which he defines as the “need to 
protect society against persons” formally involved in the JCE who are aware 
that crimes may be committed by others not in the JCE or who “do not oppose 
or prevent” such crimes.70
Cassese’s reading of liability is very broad and his standard of mens rea 
very low. “Considerations of public policy” also seems an odd rationale for a 
legal doctrine because such considerations are essentially political. To establish 
a court might be a question of public policy, but the court is then expected to 
work impartially and observe the constitution, or statute, that created it.  To 
assume that society needs to be protected from a person simply because he 
has been indicted appears to assume guilt rather than innocence. However, 
his argument is congruent with practice at the ICTY ever since the Appeals 
Chamber accepted the notion of JCE offered by prosecutors who lacked suf-
ficient evidence to convict in a Trial Chamber. Guilt no longer needs to be 
proven beyond a doubt; simple negligence suffices to establish liability. Verena 
Haan, a legal reporter, views the Appeal Chamber’s formulation of the doctrine 
as confirmation that the Tribunal is “a political instrument,” and she concludes 
and so validate claims by the Prosecution that it is telling the true history of the wars of succes-
sion. 
70 Cassese, “The Proper Limits,” pp. 109-114, 122-3.
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that it is “difficult to suppose that the tribunal is primarily about justice” even 
though in order “to respond to its political vocation, the tribunal has to give an 
impression of justice.”71 Whether this is true, the concept of JCE certainly lacks 
explanatory value in a historical sense, since the evidence adduced to convict 
is both incomplete and inconclusive.72 It seems reasonable to ask whether the 
Prosecution’s use of evidence and the decisions of the Tribunal might be less 
than impartial and whether the doctrine of JCE might not be an attempt to 
guarantee convictions.
Even those who support the Tribunal and seek to save parts of the doc-
trine of JCE are critical of the doctrine as overly expansive. Allison Danner 
and Jenny Martinez, both of whom worked at the ICTY, have warned that 
the broad reach of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise could undermine 
international law.73 Jens Ohlin thinks there is “value to branding a defendant 
a co-perpetrator of a joint criminal enterprise rather than a co-perpetrator 
simpliciteur,” but he does not believe that JCE has a firm foundation in interna-
tional law, even if it is regularly used at the ICTY.74 William Schabas notes that 
the doctrine of “absolute” or “strict” liability is rare and that the UN Secretary 
General’s report recommending establishment of the ICTY specifically reject-
ed guilt by association. The Tribunal’s Statute requires that to be convicted 
the accused must be found guilty of “willful” killing and have had “reason to 
know” about the crime; it does not include “negligent or irresponsible com-
mand” and limits the Tribunal’s jurisdiction “to natural persons” who have 
committed crimes. Because proving mens rea is necessary to demonstrate guilt 
for crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction, Schabas argues that JCE is a prob-
lematic legal doctrine “devised” by the ICTY’s judges. He views their “expan-
sion of mens rea” as “an easy but dangerous, approach” because “stretching no-
tions of individual mens rea too thin may lead to the importation of criminal 
liability on individuals for what is actually guilt by association, a result that is 
71 Verena Haan, “The Development of the Concept of Join Criminal Enterprise at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” International Criminal Law Review 5 (2) 
(2005): 167-202.
72 To be credible, evidence must meet the tests of “human knowledge” and “reasonableness.” 
Historians disagree regarding which methodologies yield the best explanations but agree that 
a historical study is explanatory if its conclusions are based on credible and sufficient evidence, 
which appears not to be the case with category 3 JCE; if the questions being answered are clearly 
conceived, which again appears not to be the case with JCE; and if it is related to the current 
state of historical research, which the indictments are to the extent that they deal with crimes 
committed during wartime. Nicholas Rescher and Carey B. Joynt, “Evidence in History and the 
Law,” The Journal of Philosophy 56 (13) (June1959), p. 566, and R. F. Atkinson, Knowledge and 
Explanation in History. An Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 
1978), pp. 116, 134-7.
73 Danner and Martinez, AGuilty Associations,” pp. 1-70.
74 Ohlin, “Joint Intentions,” pp. 695-720. The ICC uses the doctrine of “co-perpetration” rather 
than JCE.
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at odds with the driving principles behind the creation of this International 
Tribunal.”75
In practice, the doctrine of JCE has been a magic bullet that enables the 
Prosecutor to indict at will and be confident that convictions will follow be-
cause the crimes of which the defendant is accused do not even have to be part 
of a JCE.76 The use of the doctrine consequently raises questions not only for 
lawyers like William Schabas, but also for historians, because such a broad 
reading of mens rea suggest that prosecutors and judges are more interested in 
convicting those indicted than in “telling the truth” about the wars that accom-
panied the dissolution of Yugoslavia. By lowering the threshold for conviction, 
prosecutors and judges also lowered the quality of evidence and the decisions 
based on it. They also appear to have transformed the ICTY from a criminal 
court that follows the “culpability paradigm,” which demands conviction only 
if mens rea has been firmly established, into a court of transitional justice that 
sees itself as playing a political role in the successor states to Yugoslavia and a 
diplomatic role on the world stage. It is thus worth recounting briefly why the 
Tribunal adopted such a controversial doctrine.
The concept of “joint criminal enterprise”—which is also referred to as a 
“common purpose” or a “common plan”—is the result of an appellate judg-
ment which upheld the Prosecution’s appeal of the acquittal of Duško Tadić 
on a charge of murder in July 1999. The Trial Chamber had found that it could 
not, “on the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused had any part in the killing of . . . five men.” The Prosecutor appealed 
the verdict to the Appeals Chamber, which interpreted the language of Article 
7(1) of the ICTY’s Statute to mean that the crimes falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal “might also occur through participation in the realisation 
of a common design or purpose.” It argued that Tadić was guilty of the mur-
ders, even though his guilt could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, be-
cause all participants in the common design are liable for crimes that were the 
“predictable consequence of [the design’s] execution” if they were Areckless or 
indifferent” to that risk. The Appeals Chamber established three categories of 
“collective criminality,” with the third so broad that it encompasses crimes that 
fall outside the common design if they are a “natural and foreseeable conse-
quence of the effecting of that common purpose.”77
75 Schabas, “Mens Rea,” p. 1035.
76 Schabas, “Mens Rea,” pp. 1032-33, refers to JCE as the OTP’s “the magic bullet.” Danner and 
Martinez, “Guilty Associations,” pp. 18-19, argue that by formulating and routinely applying the 
concept of joint criminal enterprise, the OTP and the Trial and Appeals Chambers have exacer-
bated the arbitrary nature of international law and given the Prosecution “significant discretion” 
to lay crimes against individuals and groups of individuals for actions committed over a period 
of years. Also Cassese, “Reflections,” p. 122.
77 Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute holds individuals “responsible” if they “planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution 
of a crime . . . “ JCE is broader. The first category requires that the defendant entered into an 
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The Appeals Chamber justified its interpretation of the Statute by citing 
cases from both customary international law and domestic law, but most do-
mestic law codes do not include liabilities comparable to joint criminal enter-
prise, and even countries that do, like Canada and Great Britain, recognize 
liability only for foreseeable crimes. The doctrine is not in the ICTY’s Statute, 
it was not invoked by the Prosecution at the International Military Tribunals 
after World War II, and it is not in the UN Charter or that of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.78 The Tribunal at Nuremberg and those created by the 
Control Council were wary of charging Germans for their participation in a 
“common plan” or for “crimes against peace,” preferring instead to prosecute 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity, the latter category created to in-
clude civilians. The tribunal that tried Ernst von Weizsaecker found that rank, 
knowledge, and official declarations were insufficient to establish liability for a 
common plan without “substantial” participation. As Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter, he knew of Nazi plans, but he did not participate in an affirmative manner, 
he opposed them. Consequently, the judges separated his “formal” declara-
tions from his personal beliefs and his efforts to oppose those plans. Despite 
his prominence and his high position, “he was an implementor and not an 
originator,” so he “could oppose and object,” but “not override.” The tribunal 
sought “to ascertain what he did and whether he did all that lay in his power 
to frustrate a policy which outwardly he appeared to support.” If so, they were 
“not interested in his formal, official declarations, instructions, or interviews 
with foreign diplomats.”79
In this judgment intent appears to override actions and the requirement 
to establish mens rea is certainly more stringent than in Category 3 JCE, for 
which prosecutors need demonstrate only that the defendant participated in 
a common design in order to hold him liable for crimes that he did not in-
tend, so long as those crimes were foreseeable by a “reasonable” person. This 
objective standard of evidence lowers the relevant mental state of the accused 
from intention to commit or aid and abet a crime to recklessness for crimes 
committed within the design and to simple negligence for those committed 
outside it. A defendant can therefore be held liable for crimes that he did not 
agreement with others to commit crimes. The second refers to “systems of ill-treatment,” and 
prosecutors need demonstrate only the existence of such a system and the defendant’s active 
participation in it, his knowledge of its nature, and his intent to further it. To illustrate the third 
category, the Appeals Chamber restated the case against Tadić as a hypothetical situation. See 
Danner and Martinez, “Guilty Associations,” pp. 24-26.
78 Danner and Martinez, “Guilty Associations,” pp. 22-23, 27.
79 Sanford Levinson, “Responsibility for Crimes of War,” in Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, 
and Thomas Scanlon, eds., War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974), pp. 103-133. Von Weizsaecker was indicted for “crimes against peace; participation in 
a common plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive war; two counts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity; plunder and spoliation; slave labor; and membership in criminal organiza-
tions.” He was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
J. J. SADKOVICH, Truth, History, and the International criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
178
actually foresee but purportedly would have foreseen had he been reasonable. 
William Schabas notes that an objective criterion is “well-accepted in criminal 
justice system in the case of negligence-based offenses,” but such offenses are 
“not treated as the most serious crimes and they do not attract the most serious 
penalties.” They usually fall into the category of “anti-social behaviour” and do 
not involve “malice and premeditation.” However, at the ICTY, defendants are 
indicted for the most serious crimes and sentenced to long terms in prison “on 
the basis of what can amount to a negligence-like standard of guilt.” The wide-
spread use of JCE by the Prosecution thus dilutes mens rea and raises “policy” 
questions regarding the Tribunal. Schabas argues that specific proof of guilt is 
essential because “[t]he right to know is also a collective right, drawing upon 
history to prevent violations from recurring in the future.” He thinks that the 
law is badly served if a court can convict a defendant because he “ought to 
have known” and wonders whether history is “served if we say . . . that we may 
not be able to prove that Hitler was personally involved in the final solution 
or even had knowledge of it, but this doesn’t matter because he ought to have 
known about it, and he was derelict in his duty as a superior or commander 
[for not knowing]?”80 The answer is obvious, even if the question is rhetorical, 
as are the ramifications of such jurisprudence. The ICTY may have satisfied 
“victims” in the short run, but in the long run it has served history badly.
Although the Appeals Chamber in Tadić argued that it derived the concept 
of joint criminal enterprise from international customary law, the doctrine is 
distinct from conspiracy and organizational liability, the doctrines that were 
used by Nuremburg Tribunal. This is peculiar, because, as Danner and Marti-
nez note, the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise “is historically and concep-
tually related both to conspiracy and to the prosecution of criminal organiza-
tions.” However, their review of case law suggests that post-World War II cases 
provide “almost no support for the most controversial aspects of contemporary 
joint criminal enterprise doctrine.” They were “struck by the lack of precedent 
for the current form of JCE” in the cases adduced by the Appeals Chamber 
in support of its interpretation of the ICTY Statute. For example, they note 
one set of cases offered as precedents for JCE in which the defendants were 
all “present or in the immediate vicinity of the murders.” Consequently, no 
one was charged with participation in a “larger plan,” and it is difficult to see 
how such cases can constitute precedents for alleged designs that “span several 
years and extend throughout entire regions and even countries.”81
80 Schabas, “Mens Rea,” pp. 1033-35. 
81 Danner and Martinez, “Guilty Associations,” pp. 29-31; Schabas, “Mens Rea,” passim. Ohlin, 
“Joint Intentions,” pp. 708-713, found “not a single international case cited in the Tadić opinion 
that includes the language of liability for actions that were reasonably foreseeable.” Crimes like 
genocide require specific intent, and even the conviction of camp guards at Dachau was for aid-
ing and abetting, not participating in a joint criminal enterprise. He suggests abandoning the 
category, since it is “well-settled law” only in the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber.
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The failure of the ICTY to cite the judgments by the IMT at Nuremberg 
and the tribunals established by the Control Council is not as surprising as it 
seems, because both of the latter applied stringent standards of evidence that 
would undermine the doctrine of JCE. The military tribunal that tried Ernst 
von Weizsaecker was not only “reluctant to convict without overwhelming evi-
dence of both knowledge and participation,” it was “willing to accept counter-
evidence” of his innocence. As Sanford Levinson noted, while a decent man 
might have resigned his post once he knew of what his government was doing, 
indecency is not a crime. Indeed, Michael Walzer suggests that having “dirty 
hands” is an inevitable side-effect of engaging in politics.82 What mattered to 
the tribunal was whether the German diplomat was complicit in the crimes 
committed by others, and it convicted him only for his failure to object to the 
treatment of the Jews when queried by the SS regarding the Foreign Ministry’s 
opinion on the matter, a crime for which he received a sentence of seven years. 
He was not convicted for the deportation of Hungarian Jews because his link 
to the event was “slight and insignificant,” a judgment that suggests “some kind 
of de minimis test.” Nor was he convicted for failing to subvert the German 
government or harboring “nationalist” sentiments. Unlike the Prosecution, the 
tribunal’s judges approved of loyalty to one’s country, even one run by the Nazi 
Party, and they sought to put themselves in the defendant’s shoes, not force the 
defendant into those of a “reasonable,” and imaginary, man.83 
“The prosecution insists, however, that there is criminality in his assertion 
that he did not desire the defeat of his own country. The answer is: Who does? 
One may quarrel with, and oppose to the point of violence and assassination, a 
tyrant whose programs mean the ruin of one’s country. But the time has not yet 
arrived when any man would view with satisfaction the ruin of his own people 
and the loss of its young manhood. To apply any other standard of conduct is 
to set up a test that has never yet been suggested as proper, and which, assur-
edly, we are not prepared to accept as either wise or good.”
Such a judgment is unlikely today, given the current ill-repute of sovereignty 
and loyalty to one’s country, but it is hardly a convincing precedent for JCE. 
By embracing this doctrine, the ICTY has effectively rejected both state 
sovereignty and Article 51 of the UN Charter, which guarantees states the right 
to defend themselves, because it criminalizes military operations as such, given 
82 Michael Walzer, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” in Marshall Cohen, Thomas 
Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1974), pp. 62-82.
83 Levinson, “Responsibility for Crimes of War, pp. 122-5. Although von Weizsaecker’s remarks 
to the Belgian ambassador were “deceptive” and suggested “that he was consciously, even though 
unwillingly, participating in the plans” to wage aggressive war, the tribunal argued that “in de-
termining matters of this kind we may not substitute the calm, undisturbed judgment derived 
from after knowledge, wholly divorced from the strain and emotions of the event, for that of the 
man who was in the midst of things, distracted by the impact of the conflagration and torn by con-
flicting emotions and his traditional feelings of nationality.” [Emphasis added.]
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that crimes inevitably occur during wartime and every commander must be 
assumed to foresee that bad things will occur, even if he does not order them. 
Even wars undertaken in self-defense and operations whose goal is to reclaim 
national territory seized and occupied by another state are therefore fraught 
with the risk of indictment.84 The doctrine of JCE has lowered the bar for the 
prosecution to simple negligence, which means that the Tribunal has jettisoned 
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” component of criminal courts and appears to 
be functioning like a transitional court in which justice takes a back seat to 
politics broadly defined.85 And to invoke transitional justice as a rationale for 
action is to invite all sorts of mischief.86
Witnesses and Journalists
Unlike post-World War tribunals, the ICTY relies heavily on oral testimo-
ny. In its first decade, it heard more than a thousand witnesses, among them 
EU monitors, UNPROFOR personnel, diplomats, journalists, members of the 
opposing sides, and those who had concluded plea bargains.87 The impact of a 
given witness can be cumulative because testimony is “recycled” and used in 
other trials.88 Given its reliance on oral testimony, one would expect its pros-
ecutors and judges to be particularly careful with witnesses, especially since 
there is no jury and the three-judge panels of the Trial Chambers convict by a 
majority opinion, not by consensus, and the decisions of the Appeals Cham-
ber are considered precedent.89 However, Patricia Wald notes that there are 
“strong restraints on evidence about a victim’s past or allegations of consent in 
84 Joseph C. Sweeney, “The Just War Ethic in International Law,” Fordham International Law 
Journal 27 (6) (June 2004): 1865-1903, notes that because the UNSC issues ambiguous instruc-
tions and “is not a court,” it is difficult to say whether states that employ force while acting with 
its approval are waging “just” wars.
85 Schabas, “Mens Rea,” pp. 1029-34,  cites Glanville Williams, who narrowly defined “willful 
blindness” as having “suspected the fact,” “realized its probability,” and then “refrained from 
obtaining the final confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge.” 
Schabas argues that “any wider definition would make the doctrine of willful blindness indistin-
guishable from the civil doctrine of negligence in not obtaining knowledge.” He concludes that 
“it is impossible to reconcile” a narrow definition of intent “with the lower threshold established 
for superior responsibility in the Statute as interpreted by the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber in De-
lalic.” 
86 See Csilla Kiss, “The Misuses of Manipulation: The Failure of Transitional Justice in Post-
Communist Hungary,” Europe-Asia Studies 58 (6) (Sept. 2006): 925-940.
87 Meron, “Reflections,” p. 560. Barria and Roper, “How Effective Are International Criminal 
Tribunals?” p. 360.
88 Wald, “Punishment of War Crimes,” p. 1130.
89 Wald, “Punishment of War Crimes,” p. 1128, notes the binding nature of the Appeals Cham-
ber’s rulings.
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sexual crimes,”90 and the ruling by the Appeals Chamber in Brđanin suggests 
that some judges assume that all war correspondents tell the truth, i.e., that a 
person’s profession confers credibility.91 The reversal of three convictions in 
Kupreškić suggests that judges cannot always assess whether a witness is cred-
ible and that the uncorroborated evidence of a single witness is not trustwor-
thy.92 The Tribunal has also obtained discrete, and often anonymous, support 
from states, a practice that Theodor Meron, President of the Tribunal from 
2003 to 2005, considered to be “clearly in tension with the defendant’s right to 
challenge the evidence against him.”93
The ICTY’s supporters argue that granting anonymity reassures victims 
who might otherwise feel too intimated to testify, but critics view the practice 
as a serious violation of due process that erodes the rights of the accused.94 
Historians deal cautiously with evidence that is gathered anonymously and 
testimony that is given without identifying the witness. While few historians 
believe that the credibility of evidence can be firmly established, all historians 
cite their sources so that the reader can check them if he chooses to do so.95 
Most historians would also agree that the credibility of evidence depends in 
part on context and that if the source of the evidence is anonymous, the evi-
dence is suspect because it is necessary to know something about its source 
to know whether it can be trusted. In the case of a witness, without knowing 
something about him, it is difficult to determine whether he can tell the truth 
and has reason to do so.96
90 Wald, “International Criminal Courts,” p. 244.
91 Megan A. Fairlie, “Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić. Case No. IT-99-36-AR739,” American 
Journal of International Law, 98 (4) (2004): 807.
92 Diane Marie Amann, “Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-A, American Journal of Inter-
national Law 96 (2) (April 2002): 440-1. The indictment in Kupreškić covered a seven-month 
period but the trial focused on a single incident in a single house reported by a single witness. 
93 Rule 70 of the ICTY’s Rules and Procedures allows the use of confidential material in the 
investigative and pretrial phases. Such materials are opened if used at trial, unless the state sup-
plying them elects to block their use. Meron, “Reflections,” pp. 560-1, thinks this practice creates 
a problematic “balance between fairness (or at least confidence in accuracy) . . . and finality [of 
the verdict] at the Tribunal.” (Emphasis added)  
94  Leigh, “The Yugoslav Tribunal,” pp. 235-238, and “Witness Anonymity,” pp. 80-83, opposed 
the practice, but Chinkin, “Due Process and Witness Anonymity,” pp. 75-79, defended it. Wald, 
“International Criminal Courts,” p. 245, noted that “nearly half of all victim-witnesses who testi-
fied demanded protective conditions.”
95  Rescher and Joynt, “Evidence in History and the Law,” p. 562-3, and passim, note the diffi-
culty of providing “demonstrative proof ” and argue that human action “is governed by probable 
evidence, and not by proof.” So it “can, and frequently must, be based on evidence that supplies 
merely a comparative likelihood, and not likelihood per se.” Also Rolf Torstendahl, “Fact, Truth, 
and Text: The Quest for a Firm Basis for Historical Knowledge around 1900,” History and Theory 
42 (3) (Oct. 2003): 305-331.
96  Linda Shopes, “Oral History and the Study of Communities: Problems, Paradoxes, and 
Possibilities,” Journal of American History 89 (2) (Sept. 2002): 590, considers it crucial to 
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The increasing use of “witness statements” by the ICTY is also cause for 
concern because it erodes due process by precluding cross-examination of the 
witness by defense counsel and so deprives the accused of the right to confront 
his accuser.97 The use of plea bargains is also questionable, despite the argu-
ment by the Trial Chamber in Nikolić that “the mitigating effect of a guilty 
plea in this Tribunal is much broader” than in domestic courts because “the 
accused contributes to establishing the truth about the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia and contributes to reconciliation in the affected communities.” 
However, Ralph Henham argues that neither assertion has been empirically 
proven, and Chandra Sriram’s study of Sierra Leone suggests that special tri-
bunals obstruct reconciliation, contribute little to establishing the rule of law, 
keep old wounds open, and are viewed by many as a “political tool” because 
not all “big men” are indicted. James Meernik argued that the disparity in “sta-
tus” between the accused and the prosecution and judges at the ICTY makes it 
mandatory to use “impartial criteria for judging,” but Nancy Combs found that 
judges on the Trial Chambers in Sierra Leone “take a cavalier approach to testi-
monial deficiencies” and “are often content to base their convictions on deeply 
flawed testimony.”98 Henham concluded that plea agreements are “popular” at 
the ICTY because they assure “certainty [of conviction] and expediency [of 
trial],” even though they “accentuate the relative weakness of the accused’s ne-
gotiating position as citizen of a subjugated state” and contribute to a “lack of 
transparency” regarding process and sentencing.99
An eyewitness to events can be a valuable source, but only if her testimony 
is credible and she can convey it accurately. But confidence is not the same as 
credibility, and an eyewitness can never be assumed to be credible, a confes-
sion reliable, or a prosecutor trustworthy, which is why common law systems 
employ an adversarial process at trial. As Patricia Wald has observed, “[m]
emories fade, key witnesses often will not come forward . . . and the witnesses 
who do come forward often tell stories that differ from earlier statements made 
establish the provenance of evidence because interviews, like oral testimony, make more sense 
once placed “in the intellectual and social contexts of their generation.” Doing so also helps the 
interviewer “to understand how the context unavoidably shaped the inquiry.” Mark Feldstein, 
“Kissing Cousins: Journalism and Oral History,” The Oral History Review 31 (1) (2004): 10-
17, a journalist turned oral historian, notes the difficulty in conducting interviews and how 
“empathy” for a subject can destroy “objectivity.” Rescher and Joynt, “Evidence in History,” pp. 
563-5, argue that determining what constitutes “sufficient evidence” to convict or to inform an 
historical interpretation is “a complex and subtle matter which cannot be appropriately taken 
up in the abstract but requires consideration of the particular characteristics of specific evidential 
contexts. It is a fundamentally pragmatic and expedient matter.” (Emphasis added.)
97 Wippman, “The Costs of Justice,” p. 880.
98 Combs, “Testimonial Deficiencies,” pp. 240, 261, 264; Sriram, “Wrong-Sizing International 
Justice?”  pp. 472-506, concluded that the Trial Chambers in Sierra Leone “are often content to 
base their convictions on deeply flawed testimony.”
99  Henham, “Plea Bargaining,” pp. 604-606; Meernik, “Victor’s Justice,” p. 140.  
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to investigators in the field.”100 Witnesses may also deliberately lie or testify to 
seek revenge on former enemies.101 Both accusations and confessions can be 
credible but untrue or unverifiable,102 an observation especially true of tes-
timony and reports regarding revolutions and civil wars.103 These are formi-
dable problems that make oral testimony problematic, particularly given that 
the decision as to whether a witness is truthful, a document significant, or an 
intercept credible is subjective. James Meernik therefore based his study of the 
ICTY on an examination of verdicts and sentences, not on “the factors that 
weigh into these decisions,” which are “more intangible and thus difficult to 
measure.”104 Yet from the investigative phase through the sentencing, it is pre-
cisely such “intangible” and “difficult to measure” factors that drive the process 
at the ICTY.
To determine the credibility of a witness, a historian poses a variety of 
questions. Can the witness tell the truth? Was he present at the event? Is he a 
witness with competence or expertise regarding the event he witnessed? Was 
he paying attention at the time the event occurred? Are the questions posed to 
him designed to solicit a particular answer? Is his testimony objective or sub-
jective? Is his reasoning logical or circular? A historian would want to know 
whether the witness is willing to tell the truth and whether his testimony is 
distorted owing to self-interest, perspective, bias, a desire to cooperate or ob-
struct, or any other reason. He would be attentive to style and language, which 
can distort meaning in written testimony and documents, and to convention, 
which can do so in both oral and written testimony. Should a witness pass all 
these tests, a historian would still not assume that her testimony is accurate 
unless it could be corroborated, either by other witnesses or, ideally, by ar-
chival sources.105 Even then, he would achieve only a degree of certainty, not 
100 Wald, “Punishment of War Crimes,” p. 1131.
101 Combs, “Testimonial Deficiencies,” pp. 240, 261, 264, found that witnesses regularly lie; Sri-
ram, “Wrong-sizing International Justice?” passim, notes that revenge is a factor in testimony in 
Sierra Leone.
102 The New York Times, 1 December 2002, for confessions obtained under duress, and  “District 
Attorney Asks Judge to Drop Strauss-Kahn Case,” The New York Times, 23 August 2011, for 
the decision to drop rape charges against Dominique Strauss-Kann, at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/08/23/nyregion/strauss-kahn-case-should-be-dropped-prosecutors-say.html, 
accessed 23 August 2011. In both cases, police and prosecutors were certain of their evidence, 
which subsequently proved too unreliable to bring to trial in a common law system.
103 Richard Cobb, The Police and the People. French Popular Protest, 1789-1820 (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1972), pp. xvi-xvi; Jacob Mundy, “Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the 
New Wars Debate,” Security Dialogue 42 (279) (2011): 279-295,discusses the difficulty of estab-
lishing the accuracy of reports during and after civil wars, including how people died and who 
died.
104 Meernik, “Victor’s Justice,” pp. 145, 150. 
105 Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method (New York, 1951), 
pp. 53-4, 139-69.
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complete certainty, because historians retain a degree of doubt regarding their 
sources, even those that appear to be credible.106
The ICTY has called witnesses who not only participated in the wars, but 
who have an interest in how the wars and their particular roles in them are 
viewed by the Tribunal, the public, and posterity. Among those who have testi-
fied are Peter Galbraith, a diplomat who served as US ambassador to Croatia 
from 1993 to 1997 and who was viewed by Croats as hostile to their sover-
eignty interests in 1994 and 1995107; Stipe Mesić, a Croatian politician who 
participated in events as a member of the Croatian government and the HDZ 
until he broke with Franjo Tuđman and his government in 1994108; Stjepan 
Kljuić, a Croatian politician from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who was president 
of the HDZ there until forced out by members of the party who believed that 
he had put Muslim interests above Croat interests109; Ed Vulliamy, a British 
106 Carlo Ginzburg, Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1992),, 
pp. 157-60, discusses the problems inherent in “suggestive questioning” and the “monologic” 
nature of apparently “dialogic” testimony in which defendants echo inquisitors, and for the 
“codes” contained in such dialogues. Ginzburg was discussing the courts of the Inquisition, but 
his comments apply as well to testimony at the ICTY, where witnesses often echo the lawyers or 
are frequently asked only for “yes” and “no” answers and, of course, testify anonymously.
107  Mr. Galbraith could only “tell the truth” as he knew it. He was in Croatia in 1994 and 1995, 
but he was not present at many of the events noted in his testimony and relied on reports by 
others. He is not competent to assess some of the events he described, e.g., the shelling of Knin, 
for which he used a UN report that was itself second-hand because UN personnel were not in 
the city when the shelling occurred. One can assume that Mr. Galbraith was paying attention 
at the time that the events he testified about occurred, since that was his job, but the questions 
posed to him by lawyers for the Prosecution and the Defense were designed to solicit particular 
answers, and it seems reasonable to assume that he was concerned with how others would view 
his role in the events of 1994-1995, so his testimony is probably less objective than it is subjec-
tive. Whether Mr. Galbraith’s “reasoning” is logical, circular, or self-serving requires a separate 
essay, but it seems reasonable to assume that he had some “self-interest” in showing both himself 
and the United States in the best light possible, and that his perspective and bias reflected his na-
tionality and position. Given that he was a witness for the Prosecution, it also seems reasonable 
to assume that he sought to reinforce the Prosecution’s case and to obstruct the Defense’s efforts 
to discredit it. Certainly Croatian leaders considered him less than reliable. Hrvoje Šarinić, Svi 
moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem (Zagreb: Globus, 1999), p. 16, noted that the 
US Ambassadors and his associates did not understand the situation in Croatia. “Autori toga 
plana,” he wrote, “pokazali su potpuno nepoznavanje situacije, povijesti, odnosa snaga, uvjerenja 
i vrštine našeg naroda i našeg vodstva. Jednostavno ništa nisu shvatili preslikavali su rješenja iz 
svojih zemalja u ove prostore. . . .” Like Franjo Tuđman, Šarinić was convinced that the Croatian 
people would not accept such a solution.
108 For a critique of Mesić’s testimony, see Miroslav Tuđman, Vrijeme krivokletnika (Zagreb: 
Detecta, 2006).
109 Kljuić’s role is particularly interesting, given that he helped to formulate HDZ policy in June 
1991, as he noted during a meeting of the HDZ on policy in December of that year. See Predrag 
Lucić, ed., Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne (Split and Sarajevo: Kultura & Rasvjeta, 2005), vol. I, pp. 
75-128.
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journalist whose reporting appeared to be biased in favor of Muslims110; John 
Allcock, a British academic111; Robert Donia, co-author of a book which de-
picted Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multicultural paradise prior to 1991112; 
Hrvoj Šarinić, who maintained discrete contact with Slobodan Milošević for 
Franjo Tuđman between 1991 and 1995 in an effort to find a negotiated resolu-
tion to the conflict in Croatia113; Robert Stewart, a commander of UNPROFOR 
whose published memoirs need to be compared to the entries in his diary114; 
and Davor Marijan, a Croatian scholar whose publications on the war in Croa-
tia are based on archival material captured from the RSK.115 It is, at best, a 
mixed group, and it is not obvious which are credible. To determine that, it 
would be necessary to know something of the background of each, which ano-
nymity would make impossible. 
Once a witness’ background is known, it is possible to challenge their 
testimony, but the ICTY has increasingly resorted to witness statements, 
which preclude cross-examination. Commenting on a decision by the Ap-
peals Chambers to accept as evidence what a journalist for The Washington 
Post without requiring him to testify, Megan Fairlie argued that by defining 
a “war correspondent” as all “individuals who, for any period of time, report 
(or investigate for the purposes of reporting) from a conflict zone on issues 
relating to the conflict,” the judges had unduly expanded the definition to in-
clude people who were not even journalists. By ruling that war correspondents 
“serve a public interest in providing accurate information from a conflict-torn 
area,” the Appeals Chamber had also prejudged evidence and “circumvented 
the Tribunal’s rule-making process.” Given that the ICTY is “more dependent 
on the testimony of journalists than any national judicial system,” the ruling 
was had far-reaching ramifications. It also fails to take into account that re-
ports by journalists who reported on the wars were based in the capitals of the 
110 Ed Vulliamy began work as a journalist with The Guardian in 1986 and wrote Seasons in Hell: 
Understanding Bosnia’s War (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), so he would be accepted as a 
war correspondent under the Brđanin decision discussed by Fairlie. During cross-examination 
in May 2006, he said that he was “not a war correspondent,” nor “a political reporter,” and that he 
had not “spen[t] very much time with political leaders” in Herzegovina. Unable to answer ques-
tions about HOS, the HVO, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he noted that, “I do, did, . . . certainly 
did have, what could be called the layman on the ground on a fast learning curse idea of what it 
is that Mr. Boban was talking about.” See ICTY transcripts, Prlić, pp. 1494-1526, 1538-87, esp. 
pp. 1671-88.
111 John B. Allcock, “Rhetoric of Nationalism in Yugoslav Politics,” in John B. Allcock, John J. 
Horton, and Marko Milivojevic, eds., Yugoslavia in Transition.  Choice and Constraints.  Essays 
in Honor of Fred Singleton (New York: Berg, 1992).
112 Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New 
York: Columbia UP, 1994).
113 Šarinić, Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem, passim.
114 Robert Stewart, Broken Lives (London: Harper Collins, 1993), and “Diary,” (photocopy).
115 Davor Marijan, “Expert Opinion: On the War Connections of Croatia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (1991-1995),“ Časopis za suvremenu povijest (2004) 36 (1): 249-292.
J. J. SADKOVICH, Truth, History, and the International criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
186
belligerents and appear to have been influenced by the local political culture.116 
Fairlie considered the ruling “troubling for several reasons”—it is “thinly and 
poorly reasoned,” it “establishes a relatively generous privilege of potentially 
broad application,” and it “undermines the right of an accused to confront his 
or her accuser.”117 Mark Feldstein, who worked as a journalist, would add that 
such a ruler suggests that the judges know little about the business of journal-
ism, which “cannot be divorced from the fact that it is ultimately a commercial 
vehicle for selling advertisements,” and so “the business dictates of increasingly 
corporate journalism alter what truths journalists are allowed to present and 
how they are presented.”118
Historians also use reports by war correspondents, but they are aware that, 
as the cliché runs, the first casualty of war is the truth, and they would not as-
sume that reports by war correspondents are always accurate. Just as Fairlie was 
troubled by the legal problems resulting from the Appeals Chamber’s ruling, a 
historian should be concerned at the naïve and credulous nature of the decision, 
particularly given that at least one war correspondent who testified at the ICTY 
was not well versed in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s history, its politics, its ethnic 
make-up, or in military affairs, and that reporting by others varied greatly.119 
The reversal of the Trial Chamber’s findings in Kupreškić raises at least 
three questions. Which is more trustworthy, the Trial Chamber or the Ap-
peals Chamber? What does the reversal say about the rules and procedures of 
the Tribunal? And what shall we make of scholarly studies that drew on judg-
ments by the Trial Chambers before their decisions were reversed. The last is 
the easiest to address. James Meernik used a sample of 32 people convicted for 
various crimes to reach his conclusion that the ICTY conformed to a “legal” 
rather than a “political” model, i.e., that legal rather than political factors influ-
enced its verdicts and sentences. However, his sample included only four Mus-
lims, which is odd if we are dealing with a civil war in which all sides behaved 
badly.120 Sixteen Serbs were convicted of crimes against humanity and one for 
genocide, apparent confirmation that Serbs were the aggressors. One of four 
116 For discussion, see James J. Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 (Westport 
CT: Greenwood, 1998), passim. Chuck Sudetic was based in Zagreb, David Rieff in Sarajevo, and 
Laura Silber and Alan Little in Belgrade. “Parachute” journalists knew little about the country, 
its history, or its political culture.
117 Fairlie, “Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić,” pp. 805-809.
118 Feldstein, “Kissing Cousins,” p. 9.
119 Compare David Rieff, “Letter from Bosnia, Original Virtue, Original Sin,” New Yorker, 23 
November 1992 to Misha Glenny, “The Revenger’s Tragedy,” New York Review of Books, 13 Au-
gust 1992.
120 Or randomly, as suggested in Harry Eckstein, “On the Etiology of Internal Wars,” History and 
Theory 4 (2) (1965): 133-63. For an application of Eckstein’s model to the wars in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,  see James J. Sadkovich, “Internal War and the Conflict in Yugoslavia,” 
in Igor Graovac, ed., Dijalog povjeničara-istoričara. Osijek 22.–25. rujna 2005 (Zagreb: Zaklada 
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2008), pp. 101–118. 
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Muslims was acquitted and three convicted of “lesser” offenses (war crimes), 
seeming confirmation of their status as “bona fide” victims (assuming James 
Gow is correct). But what is one to make of the conviction of eight Croats for 
crimes against humanity and two for war crimes? Should we agree with James 
Gow that they were aggressors who manipulated their “victimhood” to gain 
sympathy abroad?121
Meernik argues that all of the sentences were appropriate to the indictments 
and that leaders should have received harsher sentences. Such a conclusion 
assumes that leaders were responsible for all crimes committed by those in 
lesser positions, an assumption that would not have been shared by the IMT at 
Nuremberg nor the tribunals created by the Control Council, and it begs the 
question of why these individuals were indicted for these particular crimes.122 
His conclusion is not only debatable, it became untenable after the Appeals 
Chambers reversed the sentences of four Croats by acquitting the three 
Kupreškić brothers and throwing out most of the charges against Tihomir 
Blaškić.123
121 Gow, The Serbian Project, pp. 242-5.
122 Levinson, “Responsibility for Crimes of War,” pp. 114-117, noted that although German offi-
cials could not invoke “obedience to superior orders or the act-of-state doctrine” in their defense, 
“mere participation,” even in the Nazi regime, was “not enough to label one a ‘war criminal.’ Di-
rect evidence of participation in the criminal acts themselves is necessary.” The post-World War 
II tribunals in Germany required both  mens rea and actus reus to convict. General Yamashita was 
convicted using “what can fairly be described as strict liability for the acts of his subordinates,” but 
Levinson doubted that the result could be “defended” because “General Yamashita was convicted 
for failing to take measures to prevent commission of war crimes even though no direct proof was 
offered that he ordered or even consented to the crimes or that he had the actual power to pre-
vent their commission.” Levinson argued that “anyone who does defend the justice of Yamashita 
must accept a concomitantly broad imputation of criminality vis-à-vis our own leadership in 
the Vietnam episode.” He also saw the failure to prosecute the “ordinary soldier” who actually 
performed the criminal acts as a significant problem, particularly given that it was difficult to link 
government officials to the rank and file. Both von Erdsmanndorff, Deputy Chief of the Political 
Division of the Foreign Ministry, and Karl von Ritter, liaison officer between Foreign Ministry 
and High Command, were acquitted because “[k]nowledge that a crime has been or is about to be 
committed is not sufficient to warrant a conviction except in those instances where an affirmative 
duty exists to prevent or object to a course of action.” Levinson commented that “duty” here re-
ferred to a “legal obligation and not fidelity to moral imperatives.” The tribunal did not establish a 
“requirement of supererogatory heroism; criminal responsibility ensued only if one were directly 
and knowingly linked with the commission of criminal acts.” Nor was rank sufficient to convict, 
unless “a defendant came into possession of knowledge that the invasions and wars to be waged 
were aggressive and unlawful” and he was “on the policy level [and] could have influenced such 
policy and failed to do so.” However, “as long as a member of the armed forces does not partici-
pate in the preparation, planning, initiating, or waging of aggressive war on a policy level, his war 
activities do not fall under the definition of crimes against peace. It is not a person’s rank or status, 
but his power to shape or influence the policy of his state, which is the relevant issue for determining 
his criminality under the charge of crimes against peace.” [Emphasis by Levinson]
123 Meernik, “Victor’s Justice,” pp. 153-5. Wippman, “The Costs of Justice,” p. 861, reports that 
by 2006, of 161 people indicted, 51 had been tried and 46 convicted, but he does not discuss 
nationality or indictments.
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The Trial Chamber in Kupreškić had found a single witness whose testi-
mony was crucial to the conviction of the brothers to be both “truthful and 
accurate.” In response to protests by the defense that a single witness to a single 
incident in which two people were killed and a house burned were “material 
facts” to be “pleaded, the judges responded that while allegations of an offense 
like murder might require a detailed examination of “material facts,” those of 
“persecution” required an examination only of “acts the Prosecution consid-
ered to amount to persecution.” The Trial Chamber subsequently sentenced 
the three brothers to 10, 8 and 6 years in prison for crimes against human-
ity based on the testimony of a single witness concerning a single incident, 
sentences comparable to that of von Weizsaecker. The Appeals Chamber did 
not contest the fact that the conviction was based on the testimony of a sin-
gle witness because this is allowed at the ICTY, but it noted that to do so the 
court must exercise “extreme caution,” especially if the “circumstances” of the 
crime were “difficult.” At the appeal, an “experimental psychologist” testified 
that confidence was a “personality trait,” not proof of truthfulness, and that 
witnesses often reconstruct events, which seems to have occurred in this case 
because the witness did not identify one of the brothers until a week after the 
event and five other witnesses contradicted her story, as did her own initial in-
terview. The Appeals Chamber consequently found her evidence to be “wholly 
erroneous” and “that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.” They concluded 
that “no reasonable tribunal of fact could find Vlatko Kupreškić guilty as an 
aider and abettor of persecution based on the remaining evidence,” and they 
cautioned that owing to its “nebulous character,” the doctrine of persecution 
“cannot . . . be used as a catch-all phrase.” The judges also noted that vagueness 
in pleading “goes to the heart of the substantial safeguards that an indictment 
is intended to furnish to an accused, namely to inform him of the case he has 
to meet.”124
Patricia Wald recalled that by reversing three of five convictions for the 
massacre of Muslim villagers in Ahmići owing to “insufficiency of evidence 
and procedural errors” by the Trials Chamber, she and the other judges on 
the Appeals Chamber “incur[ed] the extreme displeasure of many in the 
prosecutor’s office and many victims’ groups as well.” She herself “like[d] to 
think” that the reversals proved “that we were indeed a court dedicated to fair 
and impartial justice, not to victors’ revenge.”125 A historian, who is used to 
‘singular’ truths, might be tempted to note that all that the reversal proved was 
that the Trial Chamber had seriously erred and the Appeals Chamber had done 
what should have been done by the lower chamber.126 It earned the “extreme 
124 Amann, “Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,” pp. 439-43. The members of the Appeals Chamber were 
Patricia Wald (US), Lal Chand Vohrah (Malaysia), Rafael Nieto-Navia (Columbia), Fausto Po-
car (Italy), and Liu Daqun (China).
125 Wald, “International Criminal Courts,” p. 245.
126 Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History, pp. 5-6, notes that history’s truths 
are singular rather than plural, and so preclude the formulation of laws, just as its analytic 
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displeasure” of prosecutors and victims’ groups because it had found that a 
witness, no matter how confident, could be mistaken, and that “being there,” 
to borrow the title of a novel by Jerzy Kozinski, was not enough to warrant 
conviction for crimes against humanity.
the Kupreškić reversal suggests problems with the Tribunal’s rules and 
procedures, and with legal doctrines that seek to establish patterns and designs 
rather than individual guilt. Finding such patterns in the wars that wracked 
Yugoslavia is easy because each side was identified not only by its national-
ity, but also by its religion and its ‘ethnicity.’ In effect, to fight the enemy was 
to risk a charge of persecution. Jonathan Charney has argued that crimes like 
genocide are “usually committed under conditions in which powerful politi-
cal forces are at work,” supported by propaganda “vilifying the enemy.”127 Such 
situations are complex, not simple, as Dianne Amann has observed.
“International criminal cases typically arise out of large-scale attacks on 
whole communities, and the ensuing chaos makes adjudication difficult. Wit-
nesses may be confused, traumatized, or reluctant to testify. Physical evidence 
may be lacking or may become available late in the litigation. Suspects may 
be hard to locate or impossible to arrest. Those who do come into custody 
fact infamous charges, for crimes sometimes described imprecisely. The noto-
riety of the offenses redoubles the burden of ensuring that a defendant receives 
a fair trial. Criticism of practices by the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, whose judgments of conviction could not be appealed, 
is long-standing. The ICTY and ICTR likewise have drawn criticism for their 
handling of the rights of the accused.”128
We can now tentatively answer the three questions posed earlier. The 
judgments of both the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber need to be 
treated with some skepticism because while the latter reversed the former in 
Kupreškić, it also formed formulated the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise 
during the Tadić appeal. Any given chamber in any given case that is both 
thorough and impartial is thus probably the most credible chamber. However, 
the rules and procedures of the Tribunal appear designed to favor convictions, 
given that defendants can be convicted of capital crimes on the basis of the 
testimony of a single witness, that witnesses can testify anonymously, that a 
witness is considered credible owing to his profession, that written statements 
methodology eschews normative judgments. Historians use evidence to understand; lawyers 
and judges to convict or acquit.
127 Charney, “Progress in International Law?” pp. 461-2, thinks that leaders manipulate “ethnic, 
religious, territorial, and other passions” but that behavior is the product of genetics and “deeply 
ingrained historical events or myths.”
128 Amann, “Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,” pp. 443-4, noted that because the ICTY has no juries, 
judges are probably “more active and inquisitorial” than those presiding over common law tri-
als, acting as both fact-finders and legal decision-makers. She suggested that the only safeguard 
for the accused is “the reasoned-opinion requirement.”
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are admitted in place of oral testimony, and that the doctrines of persecution, 
command responsibility, and joint criminal enterprise allow the prosecution 
to build cases that dilute mens rea and do not require an actus reus on the part 
of the accused. As for studies based on material presented at the ICTY, it seems 
clear that they should be taken with a grain of salt because they appear to be no 
more settled than a historian’s working hypotheses. There is one more observa-
tion worth making here—that many of these ‘errors’ and the use of expansive 
legal doctrines can be traced to the intention to render justice to victims rather 
than to protect the rights of the accused, and thus to assume guilt rather than 
innocence, and to accept Yamashita rather than the rulings of the German 
tribunals.
The ICTY appears to have a bias in favor of the victim similar to that dis-
cerned in the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) and the 
SCSL (Special Court for Sierra Leone) by Chandra Sriram and Nancy Combs. 
Combs believes that this bias and an article in the Nuremberg Charter that 
inculpates an individual for belonging to certain organizations helps to explain 
the “cavalier” treatment of evidence and the high conviction rates by such tribu-
nals.129 As an example of the tendency to infer guilt from a defendant’s position 
within an organization, she cites Carla Del Ponte, former Chief Prosecutor at 
the ICTY, who argued that “[w]hen large-scale crimes are carried out system-
atically with military, police, or quasi military organs requiring communica-
tion and coordination it is logical to infer that criminal activity must have been 
the result of orders.” In effect, she argued that if a defendant was in a command 
position, he was culpable for crimes committed by his subordinates, a gloss on 
the Yamashita decision of the IMT/FE.130 However, this is an assumption that 
was not shared by the judges who sat on the IMT at Nuremberg IMT, whose 
jurisprudence was less controversial than that of its Asian cousin.131
The doctrine of command responsibility equates position with guilt, just 
as JCE defines membership in a joint undertaking as criminal and persecution 
129  Combs, “Testimonial Deficiencies,” pp. 261-8, discerns “a pro-conviction bias” among judg-
es who tend to give the benefit of the doubt not to defendants but to the witnesses, whom they 
view as victims. Sriram, “Wrong-Sizing International Justice,” pp. 489-92, note that many view 
the SCSL as imposed by the UN and a “kangaroo” court that has indicted a popular leader as a 
“scapegoat,” an observation that could be made regarding Croatian reactions to the indictment 
of Ante Gotovina. Sriram also notes that indicting leaders lets perpetrators go free.
130  Combs, “Testimonial Deficiencies,” pp. 268-9, concludes that judges draw inferences based 
on the position of the accused that lead them to ignore evidentiary deficiencies because they see 
position in an organization as “an indicator” of guilt. She cites Carla Del Ponte, “Investigation 
and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the International Level: The Experience of the ICTY,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006). 
131  See Levinson’s remarks, note 119. Also see Richard L. Lael, The Yamashita Precedent. War 
Crimes and Command Responsibility (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1982), for a historical 
assessment, and  A. S. Comyns-Carr, “The Tokyo War Crimes Trial,” Far Eastern Survey 18 (10) 
(18 May 1949):  109-114, whose contemporary assessment of the IMT/FE reads much like those 
of officials of the ICTY who write on the Tribunal.
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makes it easy to define conflicts involving nationality, religion or race as crimi-
nal. Nancy Combs concludes that there is a theoretical argument for the use of 
“controversial liability doctrines, such as joint criminal enterprise,” to help “to 
create a better alignment between the evidence that is received and the convic-
tions that are entered.” However, she argues that prosecutors must “focus less 
on an individual defendant’s particular actions and more on the defendant’s 
role in the group criminality that characterized the atrocity as a whole.” In 
practice, this would effectively mean trying individuals not for the crimes they 
actually committed but for their membership in a group, and Combs appears 
to step back away from such a position by arguing that while “a reduction in 
the standard of proof . . . can be defended as a theoretical matter,” it “should 
not be undertaken.”132
Indeed. But JCE has already codified the concept of collective responsibili-
ty and makes imputation of collective guilt easy because it is an “overinclusive” 
legal doctrine that makes no effort to distinguish levels of responsibility, or 
even whether a person intended that a crime occur, given its dilution of mens 
rea and its dismissal of actus reus. Almost four decades ago, Sanford Levinson 
cautioned that “to adopt collective responsibility is either to commit an injus-
tice or to undermine the community condemnation on which the criminal 
law rests and which especially should be the basis for the punishment of war 
crimes. If one wants to preserve the force of the notion of war criminality, he 
must find discrete criminals or else argue that in fact everyone is guilty and 
deserving of punishment.” (Emphasis in original) 133
Courts and Historians
Whatever the historical truth might be regarding the Yugoslav wars, the 
reality is that it cannot be determined by judges or by lawyers because judges 
and lawyers pursue different goals and work differently than historians. Legal 
132  Combs, “Testimonial Deficiencies, pp. 272-3, adopts a somewhat ambiguous position, not-
ing that some “recent legal and empirical scholarship . . . views the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard as a variable standard that signifies (and that should signify) different levels of cer-
tainty in different cases.”
133  Levinson, “Responsibility for War Crimes,” pp. 109-111, argued that collective punishment 
“violates fundamental standards of fairness by being ‘overinclusive’” because not everyone can 
assumed to be unable to defend themselves successfully, a judgment shared by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, which noted that , because “the declaration with respect to the organizations and 
groups, will . . . fix the criminality of its members, that definition should exclude persons who 
had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were 
drafted by the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission 
of acts declared criminal . . . . Membership alone is not enough to come within the scope of these 
declarations.” [Emphasis added.] Even if one accepts the notion of collective guilt, not everyone 
can be equally guilty and a torts (civil law) analogy “could scarcely support collective reparation 
without proof of fault” in order to confirm liability. 
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arguments and judicial decisions are not historical analysis.134 An argument by 
a prosecutor is not the equivalent of a historical analysis.135 If lawyers were able 
to tell the truth about the past writ large, we could do away with historians and 
encourage lawyers, judges, and law professors to tell us the truth about what 
happened in history, although I suspect that few law schools or courts would 
welcome the burdens that such a mandate would entail, and I am fairly certain 
that their analyses would be as “unhistorical” as those of the ICTY’s prosecu-
tors and judges.136 Competing narratives are normal to a court, not to history, 
where the narratives are, or should be, complementary. If history were a crimi-
nal trial, then the reader would be the judge and historians the advocates for 
different interpretations of what historical actors have done. Historians can be 
advocates, particularly if they are defending a state or an institution or are con-
strained by an ideology or their role as an expert witness, but normally they are 
not engaged in a partisan struggle to appropriate truth but in a non-partisan 
effort to discover it.137
Like her colleagues, Carla Del Ponte is a lawyer, not a historian. She read 
the law, not history, and her concept of truth is therefore different from that 
of a historian.138 Nonetheless, history is critical to establishing the context 
134 For some of the differences, see Rescher and Joynt, “Evidence in History and the Law,” pp. 
561-578.
135 For example, the lead prosecutor in Prlić, et al. cited passages from the transcript of a con-
versation in 1993 during which Franjo Tuđman had said that, “It is time that we take the oppor-
tunity to gather the Croatian people inside the widest possible borders.” One of his interlocutors 
commented that, “Today, there is not a single Muslim in Stolac.” Tuđman responded, “I know all 
that.” The prosecutor then announced that, “In those few sentences, in those short statements, 
Your Honours, you have it all, cause, effect, and knowledge. It is time that we take the oppor-
tunity; that’s the cause and intent. Today there is not a single Muslim in Stolac; that’s the effect. 
Tudjman’s statement: ‘I know all that,’ that’s the knowledge.” He accused the six defendants of 
being “responsible for unimaginable harm to countless victims” and evoked Robert Jackson, the 
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg by declaring that “the real complaining party . . . is civilization 
itself.” See ICTY Transcript, Prlić et al., 26 April 2006, pp. 874, 906. This, of course, is rhetoric 
using isolated phrases and sentences to establish a JCE; it is not thoughtful or objective analysis, 
but an emotional appeal based on evidence carefully selected to support the prosecution’s case.
136 Legal arguments and decisions are unhistorical because they are intended for unhistorical 
purposes, like the use of history to teach ‘lessons’ at staff colleges; Atkinson, Knowledge and 
Explanation in History, p. 123.
137 Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History, p. 136-7, notes three conditions for a his-
torical analysis to have explanatory value—its assertions must be properly evidenced, its ques-
tions must be clearly conceived, and it must be related to current historical studies. Marc Bloch, 
The Historian’s Craft (New York: Vintage, [1953]), p. 10, taught that history must explain and 
guide by promoting “a rational classification and progressive intelligibility.” Fernand Braudel, 
On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 177, put it more simply—history’s 
function is to understand what is lasting and what is provisional.
138 Carla Del Ponte was born in Lugano, Switzerland in 1947. She earned an LL.M. in 1972 and 
then worked as a notary in Lugano. She began to practice law in 1975, became an investigating 
magistrate in 1981, and then a public prosecutor who focused on financial and white-collar 
crime. She worked with an Italian judge (Giovanni Falcone) to link those in the Italian drug 
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for the evidence that the prosecution presents, particularly in indictments in 
which the charges are persecution or joint criminal enterprise because these 
are not criminal acts but patterns of behavior and assumptions about foresight. 
The judgment by the Trial Chamber in Tadić noted that “[i]order to place in 
context the evidence relating to the counts of the Indictment, especially Count 
1, persecution, it is necessary to say something in a preliminary way about the 
relevant historical, geographic, administrative and military setting about which 
evidence was received.” (Emphasis added.) However, the judges sitting on the 
Trial Chamber could rely only on expert testimony, which tends to be skewed 
toward either the Defense or the Prosecution,139 and they lacked a thorough 
knowledge of the historical literature, so they offered a naïve account of the 
history of Yugoslavia.140 “For centuries,” they wrote, “the population of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina . . . has been multi-ethnic,” and until 1991 “the multi-ethnic 
population of Bosnia and Herzegovina apparently lived happily enough 
together,” if “separately.”141 (Emphasis added.) Robert Donia, who has testified 
in numerous cases as an expert witness would certainly approve of this 
interpretation, but not all historians would do so.142 Under the impression that 
the Partisans were “a largely communist and Serb group,” the Trial Chamber 
interpreted the massacre of “up to 100,000 Croat soldiers” by Partisans 
as the “revenge of the Serbs for Ustaša atrocities.”143 According to the Trial 
Chamber, Yugoslavia’s dissolution was accompanied by civil war because the 
JNA, which it considered “a truly multi-ethnic national army” prior to 1991, 
had “intended to safeguard the integrity of the Serb people by protecting Serbs 
in predominantly Serb areas of Croatia.” War therefore “ensued between the 
JNA and the Croatian Serbs on the one hand and, on the other, the forces that 
trade to Swiss money launderers and was appointed Attorney General of Switzerland in 1994. 
She was appointed Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR in August 1999 and reappointed in 
September 2003. Since 2008, she has been Swiss ambassador to Argentina. See “Former Pros-
ecutors,” at http://www.icty.org/sid/101, consulted 18 Sept. 2011.
139 Turković, “Historians in Search for Truth,” pp. 50-67, notes that expert testimony is often 
skewed, that defense and prosecution ‘shop’ for experts who will reinforce their case, and that 
the opinions of historians are often tentative,  However, judges must render decisions, which 
makes the use of expert testimony problematic and the materials archives at the ICTY not al-
ways reliable.
140 Gottschalk, Understanding History, p. 116, considered a thorough knowledge of the sec-
ondary literature crucial because it provides the historian with context, bibliography, data, and 
interpretations and hypotheses. He believed that ignorance of the secondary literature would 
result in ill-informed and impoverished history.
141 ICTY Tadić judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, pp. 20-56.
142 Compare Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, to Mitja Velikon-
ja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2003) and the authors in Mark Pinson, ed., The Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
143 ICTY Tadić judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, pp. 20-56.
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the Croatian government could rally.”144 (Emphasis added to both citations.) 
These are “facts” that some historians would certainly “contest,” making them 
somewhat unreliable guides to historical analysis. Among those the Trial 
Chamber cited as authoritative sources regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
most recent history was Ed Vulliamy, who nine years later told a different Trial 
Chamber that he was neither a “political” reporter nor a “war correspondent.” 
By then the judgment of the Appeals Chamber in Tadić was set in stone, JCE 
was an accepted legal doctrine, and the “facts” of the case had been recycled to 
provide historical background for other cases. 
These excerpts suggest that judges occasionally prefer to use the passive 
voice than to hazard an opinion as to who initiated the Yugoslav wars and that 
the Tribunal is not a history faculty and its trials are not history seminars. It is 
an ad hoc court established by the UN Security Council, and its original man-
date was to prosecute certain individuals for certain categories of international 
crimes, not to write history. However, as the Trial Chamber in Tadić noted, 
the ICTY needs historical analysis in order to set the context needed to dem-
onstrate patterns of discrimination, without which it is difficult to prove the 
charge of persecution, and even more difficult to demonstrate the existence of 
joint criminal enterprises that span years and to establish, however imperfect-
ly, the mens rea of their members.145 Prosecutors have therefore called expert 
witnesses to inform the judges regarding pertinent historical events and their 
investigative teams have ferreted out historical evidence, including isolated 
excerpts from books written fifteen years before the crimes they supposedly 
explain took place. Much of this evidence has been contested by defense teams. 
Other evidence has also been contested and some remains sealed, including 
the identity of states and individuals that have discreetly aided the tribunal’s 
investigations.146 The Appeals Chamber may have truncated the process of in-
vestigating the past by rendering its decisions, but its judgments, like the ar-
guments by prosecution and defense lawyers and the judgments of the Trial 
Chambers, remain open to interpretation by historians, particularly given the 
disagreements between the Trial and Appeals Chambers.147
144 ICTY Tadić judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, pp. 20-56. The judges apparently 
depended for their information on the JNA on a translation of Veljko Kadijević’s book (Exhibit 
30). For Vulliamy, see ICTY transcripts, Prlić, pp. 1494-1526, 1538-87, esp. pp. 1671-88.
145 Mundy, “Deconstructing Civil Wars,” p. 288, notes the difficulty of establishing a situational 
identity during a civil war because “identities can be one of the most ambiguous aspects of mass 
violence.”
146 Meron, “Reflections,” p. 561; Leigh, “The Yugoslav Tribunal,” pp. 235-8, supported the ICTY 
but not the 10 August 1995 decision by the Trial Chamber trying Dušan Tadić to deny both the 
accused and his counsel the identity of certain witnesses. Leigh thought the ruling could under-
mine ICTY’s “credibility” because it was not consistent with either its Statute or international 
law and seriously harmed the defendant’s right to a “fair trial.” Mundy, “Deconstructing Civil 
Wars,” p. 288, notes the difficulty of establishing a situational identity during a civil war because 
“identities can be one of the most ambiguous aspects of mass violence.”
147 The Appeals Chamber overturned judgments by Trial Chambers in Blaškić, Kupreškić, Tadić, 
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Despite having collected “millions of pages” of evidence, the Prosecution 
at the ICTY has not collected enough to satisfy every research question a histo-
rian might ask, nor even some of the obvious ones, such as the role that Slove-
nia played by insisting on independence in June 1991, before solid diplomatic 
support had been established for such a move,148 or the responsibility borne by 
the European Community, the United States and the United Nations for not 
preventing the wars and then prolonging them through policies that seem to 
have been as ad hoc as the ICTY.149 However, while the Tribunal’s judges have 
interpreted the law broadly and regularly rely on expert witnesses to explain 
the historical context of the indictments, they seem to be quite narrow regard-
ing what they will allow defendants to discuss. For example, among the topics 
not discussed at the trial of Radovan Karadžić were the events surrounding 
the massacre at Srebrenica. Judge Kwon reminded the Serb leader that “the 
purpose of this trial is to judge whether you are guilty of charges as alleged in 
the indictment . . . not an opportunity for you to introduce a white book of all 
the events that took place at the time.”150 Similarly, Judge Antonetti interrupted 
Simić, and Stakić, and revised them in Krstić. See Cassese, “The Proper Limits, pp. 111-115, 123, 
and Amann, “Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,” pp. 439-445.
148 During a meeting with Croatia’s VDV (High State Council) on June 8, Franjo Tuđman pro-
posed creating a working group to slow down the Slovenes, whose push for “disassociation” 
(razdruživanje) was creating “very serious problems” for Croatia. On June 15, he told Milan 
Kučan that Croatia was not ready to declare independence, and he repeated his warning to 
Kučan a week later. Nonetheless, on June 25, Slovenia declared its independence, and Croatia 
followed suit. See Lucić, Stenogrami o podjeli Bosna, vol. I, pp. 28-30; Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: 
A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 176-8; and Milan Kučan, Testimony, 
ICTY, Milošević Trial, 21 May 2003, consulted August 2006. Zdravko Tomac, Predsjednik. Protiv 
krivotvorina i zaborava (Zagreb: Slovo, 2004), pp. 82-5, notes that Tuđman and Kučan cooper-
ated closely until June 25, 1991, but parted ways after meeting with EC mediators on Brioni. 
Franjo Tuđman, Hrvatska riječ svijetu: Razgovori sa stranim predstavnicima (Zagreb: Hrvatska 
sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1999), p. 327, said that in early 1991 when Slo-
bodan Milošević had said that Slovenia was free to leave Yugoslavia, Milan Kučan had replied 
that he believed all Serbs should have the right to live in a single state.
149 Borisav Jović, The Last Days of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.(October 22, 1996), 
[FBIS translation of Poslednji dani SFRJ: izvodi iz dnevnika (Beograd: Politika, Izdavačka delat-
nost, 1995)],  29 May 1991, wrote that he had told Jacques Santer and Jacques Delors, whom 
the EC had sent to mediate a solution to the crisis, that Serbs were frightened of both Kučan’s 
government in Slovenia and Tuđman’s government in Croatia, where Serbs had a “permanent 
memory” of the slaughter of “a million” Serbs during World War II. Jović said Stipe Mesić was 
unacceptable to head Yugoslavia’s collective presidency because he was supposedly an “advo-
cate” of “the violent separation” of Croatia from Yugoslavia. Should Mesić be elected, the Serb 
leader warned that war was likely. Should Slovenia secede, he believed war was certain. “Under 
no circumstances,” he said, would Serbia accept a “loose confederation” because Serbian lead-
ers could not “allow the Serb nation to be divided among several states” or become “a national 
minority“ in a successor state. Delors reassured Jović that “from the very outset” the EC had 
supported a unified Yugoslavia in order to avoid “civil war.”
150 Groome, “The Right to Truth,” p. 186. Nataša Kandić, “The ICTY Trials and Transitional 
Justice in Former Yugoslavia,” Cornell International Law Journal 38 (3) (2005): 789-792, esp. pp. 
790-1, was distressed that Slobodan Milošević was using his trial to tell the truth as he saw it, 
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a line of questioning during the cross-examination of Edward Vulliamy to re-
mind the defense counsel that the court was not a history seminar. “We are 
not here to investigate history,” he said, “no. We are here to decide on criminal 
responsibility.”151
Unlike Judges Kwon and Antonetti, a historian would be interested in the 
events surrounding the massacre, as were the members of Dutchbat, who bore 
part of the onus for the massacre,152 and he might even argue that one cannot 
properly understand Karadžić’s actions without examining the larger context 
in which they occurred. He certainly would be curious to know if a journalist 
called as an expert witness to describe the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in the early 1990s knew anything about multi-national and multi-ethnic states. 
If he did not, then the historian might be tempted to view his testimony as at 
best well intentioned but poorly informed. He might still render a “moral” 
judgment, but not until he had as much data as he could realistically assemble 
and evaluate.
As Judge Antonetti noted, “to decide on criminal liability” is not “to in-
vestigate history” even though in some instances it seems very much the same 
thing.153 What are obvious and important questions to a historian are often 
thus “. . . harming all efforts to have the truth and the need for justice accepted in Serbia as the 
principles of successful transition.” Kandić suggested that the court put “limits on Milošević’s 
attempts to propagandize his version of the truth.”
151 ICTY Transcript, Prlić et al., 9 May 2006, p. 1688.
152 See C. Wiebes, Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen 
veiligheidsdiensten. (Amsterdam: Boom/ Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 
2002).
153 ICTY Transcript, Milošević, 11 Nov. 2003, pp. 28710-28833, esp. p. 28731, http://www.icty.
org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/031111ED.htm., pp. 28713-28714, for this exchange 
involving Mr. Milošević, Dr. Donia, and Judge May. (Emphasis added.)
 Milošević [to Donia]: “So for you, Tadic is the most important case, where it was establish[ed] 
that what was happening in Yugoslavia at the time was an international armed conflict. Now, 
you as an historian, do you really and truly consider that what was going on within Yugoslavia 
was caused by the forceful secession of an international armed conflict, the forcible secession?”
 Judge May: “May I interrupt. This is really for the Court to determine. That should be said first. 
But the witness can, of course, answer as to his interview. And perhaps the best way to deal with 
it, to say, if you would, Dr. Donia, first of all whether what’s been put to you is direct, that that is 
what you said, and then perhaps you’d like to amplify and clarify what you said.”
 Dr. Donia: “Yes, Mr. President. I think I did indeed give an interview, and the essence of at 
least part of it was just conveyed by Mr. Milosevic. At that time, the Appeals Chamber decision 
in the Tadic case was relatively recent, and I viewed that as probably the most important conclu-
sion to have come out of the Tribunal and accepted and accept its conclusions, again as an histo-
rian and not rendering a legal opinion, but that was my conclusion at the time and would still be 
the case, that that was an important step and one with which raw judgement [sic] I concur from 
a historical standpoint.”
 Mr. Milošević:  “Mr. Donia, I’m asking you as an historian precisely. Don’t you feel that his-
torical facts are being restructured here, for example, in the Tadic case? And I don’t think that 
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obscure or irrelevant to someone focused on human rights,154 to a prosecutor 
whose job is to prove that certain individuals committed certain atrocities,155 
or to a judge bound by a court’s rules and procedures, circumscribed by prior 
decisions, and required to consider only the evidence presented at trial in or-
der to decide whether the accused is guilty or innocent of the specific points of 
an indictment. Nor are the questions a historian might ask obvious to a judge 
who believes that the ICTY was established to bring justice to Muslim victims 
of Serb and Croat aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina or that the Tribunal 
facilitates “peace through justice” and contributes “to the emergence of civil 
society as the anchor of real peace” by “fostering trust among the population 
and faith in the institutions of the State’s government.”156
These are political functions, not historical questions, and the evidence that 
Carla Del Ponte thinks so overwhelming that there can be no dissent regard-
ing her concept of what constitutes truth is incomplete because it was gathered 
to convict certain people of certain types of crime, not to answer questions 
anybody knows about him in Yugoslavia, that the facts are being established by way of the fact 
that Serbia and Yugoslavia was involved in an international armed conflict.”
 Dr. Donia: “No, I do not believe that.”
 Mr. Milošević: “Tell me, please, Mr. Donia, do you know that this conflict emerged through 
the armed secession -- was caused by the armed secession of certain parts of what was once 
Yugoslavia and that it took place exclusively within Yugoslavia?”
 Dr. Donia: “In my view, this conflict was caused by a determination on the part of you and 
others in the Belgrade leadership to prevent the peaceful secession of those republics from Yu-
goslavia as independent countries.”
154 Kandić, “The ICTY Trials and Transitional Justice,” 789-90, applauds the High Representa-
tive for forcing the government of the Republika Srpska to withdraw its 2005 report concerning 
events in and around Srebrenica between 1992 and 1995 and appoint a new commission that 
included “Bosnian Muslim members nominated by the High Representative” which wrote what 
Kandić sees as “the first official truth brought out by a government in the region of the former 
Yugoslavia.” 
155 Minna Schrag, “The Yugoslav Crimes Tribunal,” pp. 192-3, argued that, “Only by prosecut-
ing particular individuals, at all levels of responsibility, can we hope to persuade the victims that 
justice has been done.” Since the ICTY could not prosecute all perpetrators, its “primary focus 
is on the leaders who were responsible for instigating and directing the crimes.” Groome, “The 
Right to Truth,” pp. 186-7, does not believe that the accused should be free to discuss what they 
consider relevant to their defense and sees the ICTY as a “forum” to be used by “victims” “to 
have their voices heard and to live on in history.” He claims that the ICTY “has made an impor-
tant contribution to both the right to the truth held by the families of victims and the broader 
societal truth about the conflict, and that “[a]all aspects of the war have been examined in care-
ful detail.”
156 McDonald, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” was the Presi-
dent of the Tribunal at the time she made these comments. Talbert, “The ICTY and Defense 
Counsel,” pp. 975-986, notes that the focus of international criminal justice is “on the identi-
fication and punishment of the guilty,” so the focus at the ICTY is on the Prosecutor, not the 
defense. The 1997 Code of Conduct applies only to defense counsel, not the UN employees on 
the prosecutorial staff. 
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regarding what happened in and around the successor states during the 1990s. 
Given the rules of procedure that protect states and witnesses cooperating with 
the ICTY, her truth can also be difficult to verify.157 Judges are bound to con-
sider only evidence admitted during the trial, including evidence related to the 
history of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Kosovo, and the 
defunct Yugoslav state, and most of this evidence comes from the testimony of 
witnesses, not from documents or disinterested historical research based on a 
thorough reading of the secondary literature. Indeed, a great deal comes from 
diplomats, EU monitors, UN officials, journalists, local politicians, “victims,” 
and members of UNPROFOR and UNCRO, all of whom were intimately in-
volved in the wars about which they are testifying and none of whom runs even 
a minimal risk of being charged with anything more than a faulty memory.158 
The Tribunal’s judgments therefore may be final but they are not definitive, and 
157 Leigh, “The Yugoslav Tribunal,” pp. 235-8, and “Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due 
Process,” pp. 80-3, refined his argument regarding the damage done to defendants by the ruling 
in the Tadić case that the identity of certain witnesses could be withheld from the accused and 
his counsel in reply to Chinkin, “Due Process and Witness Anonymity,” pp. 75-9, who argued 
that “the accused’s right to know and confront prosecution witnesses is not absolute but may 
have to be balanced against other important interests.” Chinkin approved the Trial Chamber’s 
conclusion that if the victim had a real fear for her safety, which the alleged crime effectively 
confirmed, and if the witness was important to “proving” the terms of the indictment, then, 
should the judges decide that the witness was “trustworthy” and there was no evidence to the 
contrary, that the defense should be able to question the witness regarding “issues unrelated to 
identity and current whereabouts.” Leigh countered that without knowing the identity, includ-
ing the witness’s whereabouts at the time the alleged crime was committed, the defense could 
not mount an effective cross-examination. Chinkin seemed most concerned to protect victims 
of “sexual abuse” while Leigh worried that if “generally adopted,” her position would “equate the 
hard-won constitutional rights of the accused, which are embodied in the International Cov-
enant and derived from national judicial experience over many centuries, with victims’ rights, 
which are in the process of being defined.” He implied that this was too important a question to 
leave to “an international court of limited tenure.”
158 Schrag, “The Yugoslav Crimes Tribunal,” p. 194, notes that in the first years of its existence, 
the members of the OTP agreed that “prosecutors be, and be perceived to be, fair” and so re-
jected suggestions by those outside the OTP that they “simply rely on hearsay” and “journalists’ 
reports” and “assume” that “because a particular person was in a position of authority” he “must 
have been responsible for atrocities.” Schrag’s view, and that of her associates, was that they 
“must be exemplary in our respect for the rights of the accused” and conduct trials “according to 
the highest standards of due process.” Precisely because prosecutors have “enormous power” to 
“affect peoples’ lives,” simply by indicting, she believed they act “wisely and fairly.” But with the 
introduction of the concept of joint criminal conspiracy in the 1999 Tadić appeal, the OTP ap-
pears to have become more interested in convicting defendants than in appearing to act “wisely 
and fairly.” Wald, “International Criminal Courts,” pp. 241-260, esp. pp. 244, noted that the OTP 
could appeal an acquittal and that there was “no ban against hearsay.” Wald “Punishment of War 
Crimes,” pp. 1119-1136, esp. pp. 1128-33, was bothered by the rejection of “certain rulings of 
the International Court of Justice”; disagreements with the ICTR; the practice of sentencing at 
the same session the verdict is delivered; recycling witness testimony; differences between tes-
timony at trial and “earlier statements to investigators in the field”; the “UN bureaucracy”; and 
the apparently random selection of judges.
Review of Croatian History 7/2011, no.1, 153 - 200
199
historians need to approach the materials that it has archived as he would any 
other historical archive—with both interest and skepticism.159     
Wahrheit, Geschichte und der Internationale Strafgerichtshof für 
das ehemalige Jugoslawien
Zusammenfassung
Wie alle anderen Organisationen hat auch der Internationale Strafge-
richtshof für das ehemalige Jugoslawien (ICTY) seine Geschichte und Kul-
tur. Seine enge Verbundenheit mit den Vereinten Nationen und mit NATO-
Mitgliedstaaten suggeriert, dass er mehr als ein Strafgerichtshof ist und dass 
seine ausgedehnte Interpretation des Gewohnheitsrechtes und besonders die 
Bildung des Konzeptes der kriminellen Vereinigung die Interpretation zulas-
sen, ihn als einen Gerichtshof des Übergangsrechtes zu bezeichnen. Es scheint, 
dass die Vermehrung ähnlicher Gerichtshöfe in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten 
auf die Bildung eines Modells schließen lässt, oder dass man diese Erschei-
nung mindestens als einen Vorgänger der zukünftigen Entwicklung innerhalb 
des internationalen Rechtes betrachten kann. Dieser Gerichtshof neigte auch 
dazu, die Politik der jugoslawischen Nachfolgestaaten und die Meinung derje-
nigen zu beeinflussen, die die Kriege im ehemaligen Jugoslawien kommentier-
ten. Die meisten Leute, einschließlich der meisten Wissenschaftler könnten 
aber kaum das Konzept der kriminellen Vereinigung definieren oder die Zu-
kunft dieses Gerichtshofes beschreiben. In diesem Artikel wird bewissen, dass 
das Tribunal zu Haag seinen im Statut definierten Ankerplatz verlassen hatte 
und einen neuen Weg eingeschlagen hatte, der ihn zur Formulierung neuer 
rechtlichen Doktrinen führte, die das internationale Recht untergraben. Jene 
Wissenschaftler, die die von Anklägern gesammelten Materialien zitieren und 
159 Turković, “Historians in Search for Truth,” p. 66, reaches similar, but not identical conclu-
sions, and recommends that historians who wish to use the ICTY’s records “develop a ‘specific 
interpretative framework’ on the basis of ‘the specific code according to which the evidence has 
been constructed’” in order to be able “to decipher skewed sources of evidence” and “understand 
the procedures according to which the evidence was encoded in the judicial process and to de-
tect different sources and types of inherent evidential distortions.”  
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die vom Tribunal zu Haag getroffenen Urteile konsultieren, sollten das sehr 
vorsichtig machen, beziehungsweise sollten sich dessen bewusst sein, dass sich 
die Ziele und Funktionen der Übergangsgerichtshöfe von jenen der Strafge-
richtshöfe wesentlich unterscheiden.
